University of Massachusetts Amherst

ScholarWorks@UMass Amherst
Masters Theses

Dissertations and Theses

July 2015

"Who's Hiring the Indochinese Worker? Your Competition,
Probably": Work, Welfare Dependency, and Southeast Asian
Refugee Resettlement in Lowell, Massachusetts, 1975-1985
Janelle Bourgeois
University of Massachusetts Amherst

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.umass.edu/masters_theses_2
Part of the Asian History Commons, Labor History Commons, Social History Commons, and the
United States History Commons

Recommended Citation
Bourgeois, Janelle, ""Who's Hiring the Indochinese Worker? Your Competition, Probably": Work, Welfare
Dependency, and Southeast Asian Refugee Resettlement in Lowell, Massachusetts, 1975-1985" (2015).
Masters Theses. 182.
https://doi.org/10.7275/7031865 https://scholarworks.umass.edu/masters_theses_2/182

This Open Access Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the Dissertations and Theses at
ScholarWorks@UMass Amherst. It has been accepted for inclusion in Masters Theses by an authorized
administrator of ScholarWorks@UMass Amherst. For more information, please contact
scholarworks@library.umass.edu.

“WHO’S HIRING THE INDOCHINESE WORKER? YOUR COMPETITION,
PROBABLY”: WORK, WELFARE DEPENDENCY, AND SOUTHEAST ASIAN
REFUGEE RESETTLEMENT IN LOWELL, MASSACHUSETTS, 1975-1985

A Thesis Presented
by
Janelle Bourgeois

Submitted to the Graduate School of the
University of Massachusetts Amherst in partial fulfillment
of the requirements for the degree of
MASTER OF ARTS
May 2015
Department of History

“WHO’S HIRING THE INDOCHINESE WORKER? YOUR COMPETITION,
PROBABLY”: WORK, WELFARE DEPENDENCY, AND SOUTHEAST ASIAN
REFUGEE RESETTLEMENT IN LOWELL, MASSACHUSETTS, 1975-1985

A Thesis Presented
by
Janelle Bourgeois

Approved as to style and content by:
__________________________________
Jennifer Fronc, Chair
__________________________________
Christian Appy, Member

_________________________________
Joye Bowman, Chair, History Department

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
I would like to thank my mentors at the University of Massachusetts Amherst,
particularly my committee members Professor Jennifer Fronc and Professor Chris Appy.
Professor Fronc’s detailed and perceptive feedback encouraged me to clarify my thinking
and writing, which made this a far better work than it would have been otherwise.
Professor Appy’s insightful comments on my other written work have also made me a
better writer. I would also like to thank Professor Bruce Laurie for encouraging me to
think more critically about American labor history.
In addition I must recognized my undergraduate mentors: Professor Christoph
Strobel and Professor Bob Forrant. Without their encouragement and unflagging support
I do not think I would have applied to graduate school. Special thanks go to Professor
John Wooding for his friendship, which has meant a great deal to me.
Thanks also to my fellow graduate students for the good times and support.
Special thanks go to Emily Pipes and Kayla Pittman for reading very early (very rough)
drafts of several chapters. And last but not least, thanks to my sister Corinne and my
niece Skye, who always reminded me to take a break.

iii

ABSTRACT
“WHO’S HIRING THE INDOCHINESE WORKER? YOUR COMPETITION,
PROBABLY”: WORK, WELFARE DEPENDENCY, AND SOUTHEAST ASIAN
REFUGEE RESETTLEMENT IN LOWELL, MASSACHUSETTS, 1975-1985
MAY 2015
JANELLE BOURGEOIS, B.A., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS LOWELL
M.A. UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST
Directed by: Professor Jennifer Fronc
This Master’s thesis uses the Indochinese Refugee Foundation of Lowell,
Massachusetts, a federally funded social service provider, as a case study in the local
politics of Southeast Asian refugee resettlement. I argue that the Foundation’s archives
offered an opportunity to study the local implementation of the “economic selfsufficiency” mandate of the 1980 Refugee Act, which led the Foundation to increasingly
scramble to get refugees off of the welfare rolls and in the labor market as quickly as
possible. I conclude that this served to push refugees into low-wage, unskilled, insecure
positions such as electronics assembly, and also led to an institutionalized neglect of the
broad range of services refugees required. This neglect had a hand in creating the very
poverty the Act originally sought to prevent. The archive also offered the opportunity to
highlight two unexpected ways that Cold War militarism reshaped urban landscapes.
First, the demography and culture of Lowell were profoundly reshaped by refugees
resettled partly as a result of American Cold War foreign policy in Southeast Asia.
Second, the expansion of Defense Department funded high-technology temporarily
revitalized the city’s economic base and drew refugees to the city with the promise of
employment.
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A NOTE ON TERMS
In any historical study it is important to be conscious of terms, particularly those
used to describe ethnicity and nationality. This is particularly true in the study of
Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos. This thesis uses the term Indochinese only when it was
used by archival source material. The term is, of course, a relic of French colonial
domination in the region, and as such, is rightly no longer in use. Equally problematic is
source material that did not disaggregate Cambodian, Lao, Vietnamese and Hmong
refugees. To say nothing of smaller minority groups such as the Mien, or ethnically
Chinese individuals. This failure says as much about how caseworkers viewed their
clients as their actual reports. The alternative term Southeast Asian is, however, also
problematic. Southeast Asia refers to a much broader swath of geography than simply
Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos. For the sake of brevity, when it is impossible to determine
where a refugee in a given case file arrived from, this thesis uses the term Southeast
Asian. The thesis also uses Southeast Asian as a catch-all when describing policies and
procedures that impacted all refugees from Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos in the city of
Lowell.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
Blong Xiong, a Hmong refugee who worked for U.S. AID in Laos during the
Vietnam War, recalled two reasons for moving to Lowell, Massachusetts in 1986. First,
Xiong noted his wife’s sister lived in Lowell, and the Hmong always tried to keep close
to each other. Second, rumor had it there were an abundance of jobs in the city. Lowell’s
booming high-technology companies, in particular Wang Labs which made
minicomputers, were actively recruiting refugees to work as electronic assemblers. Xiong
recalled, “Companies were saying ‘Come over here, lots of jobs, you can work in our
company.”1 Prior to Xiong’s move in 1986 approximately 6,000 Vietnamese, Laotian,
and Cambodians refugees had been resettled in the city by NGOs under contract with the
federal government. The American Fund for Czechoslovakian Refugees (AFCR) and the
American Nationalities Council Services (ANCS) resettled the majority directly from
refugee camps and processing centers located in Thailand and the Philippines
respectively. After 1985, word of jobs in Lowell spread quickly outward through tightly
linked social networks and acted as a magnet attracting Southeast Asian refugees initially
resettled in other locales across the U.S. Indeed, by 1991 an estimated 25,000 Cambodian
and 10,000 Laotian refugees called Lowell home.
The boom that brought them, however, proved short-lived. By March 1992,
Andrew Kopkind, writing for The Nation, described the fate of Cambodian workers: “The
Cambodians were low-tech workers in high-tech industries…[they] were poorly paid,
denied benefits, kept in poor conditions- and laid off [first] when the companies began

1

Transcript Blong Oral History Interview Blong Xiong [Laos] ,Tape 8.24, March 15, 2008 by Christoph
Strobel,1, Mogan Center for Lowell History: http://library.uml.edu/clh/OH/ETHNO/OH11a.htm.
1

downsizing.”2 Kopkind went on to explain, “Now there are no jobs for them, nor will
there be…unless there’s another military buildup.”3 There are two peculiar but unspoken
ironies in Kopkind’s article. First, Kopkind suggested that high-tech electronics assembly
jobs were no better than the worst work in Lowell’s once booming textile industry, which
peaked in the late nineteenth century and entered a sustained decline beginning in the
1920s. Second, Kopkind explicitly linked the city’s revitalization to military spending
and inadvertently drew attention to the fact that refugees from U.S. wars migrated to the
city to work in U.S. defense-funded industry. Indeed, as Xiong’s recollections confirmed,
high-tech companies funded by the Defense Department such as Wang Labs actively
recruited refugees to work as electronics assemblers. City officials and planners,
however, insisted that high-technology represented the post-industrial future which would
rely on knowledge industries, the creative economy, and a new class of technocratic
workers in place of the bygone industrial era and its reliance on cheap, unskilled,
immigrant labor.
This thesis uses the archives of the Indochinese Refugee Foundation (IRF), a
federal and state funded social service provider, as a microcosm of the subtle ways Cold
War militarism diffused across urban landscapes and altered the daily lives of Americans.
The IRF offered English-language and employment training to refugees in the Greater
Boston area from 1980-1985, and developed the partnerships with defense contractors
that led refugees such as Blong Xiong to flock to the city. This thesis reconstructs the
formation of these public-private partnerships and traces the continued recruitment of
refugees for employment as electronics assemblers after the Foundation’s dissolution in

2
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Andrew Kopkind, “Grinch Capitalism: No Miracle in Lowell,” The Nation, March 30, 1992.
Andrew Kopkind, “Grinch Capitalism: No Miracle in Lowell,” The Nation, March 30, 1992.
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1985. Three nested arguments drive this study. Most broadly, I contend the Cold War,
and more specifically refugees resettled partly as a result of U.S. foreign policy in
Southeast Asia, and defense funded high-technology, need to be brought to the center of
analysis as fundamental forces shaping Lowell, and urban landscapes more broadly,
during that era.
Second, I argue that the resettlement philosophy codified in the 1980 Refugee
Act, which made economic self-sufficiency and labor market participation the metrics of
resettlement success, needs to be examined in its local context. In Lowell, the focus on
getting refugees into the labor market and off welfare translated to partnerships between
resettlement agencies and defense contracts in the region who increasingly needed lowwage, unskilled and semi-skilled labor. While economic self-sufficiency seems a rather
benign goal, it is undergirded by historically rooted and ideologically charged
assumptions that use work, both the ability and the desire, as markers to determine who is
and is not worthy of citizenship and inclusion.
Further, it is a perilously vague goal open to political vicissitudes, which became
very evident under the Reagan administration. As part of Reagan’s broader retrenchment
of the welfare state, the definition of self-sufficiency narrowed to avoiding welfare
dependency, instead of acknowledging the host of complex needs of refugees including
adequate housing, language attainment, and appropriate bi-lingual education. This
philosophy led service providers to neglect the broader range of refugee needs and served
to push refugees into the lowest paying, least secure, and least skilled sections of the
labor market. As a result refugees remained at or below the poverty line, and, in the mid1980s, violent conflict erupted over the deteriorating state of the city’s public schools.

3

Finally, I contend that examining the intersections between war refugees and
defense funded high-technology in Lowell offers a compelling case study in Cold War
labor history. On the one hand, Lowell’s high-tech industries serve as a window into work
in the wake of deindustrialization and highlight the centrality of defense spending to
emerging industry and to regional economies in the post-World War II period. My focus
on low-wage, low-skill workers in industries touted as post-industrial challenges the
dominant images of high-tech employees as engineers, scientists or highly skilled
workers. On the other hand, I argue examining Southeast Asians in Lowell as workers
provides a crucial glimpse into process by which refugees were racialized and integrated
(or not) into the American working-class.
While this thesis draws from social historians and takes a community as its base
of analysis, it also aims to transcend the limitations of community studies, and to situate
Lowell at the nexus of the complex global forces that shaped it. As historian Kimberly
Philips-Fein has pointed out, the major studies of this period have largely focused on the
figure of Ronald Reagan and politics at the national level.4 Lowell serves as a useful
initial analysis as the city is often characterized as a microcosm of the broader national
experience, a place where structural changes are exaggerated and brought into sharper
relief. As historian Marc Miller has noted, “Lowell’s life as a city is so dramatic, changes
in its archetypal community clarify trends that more moderated experiences in other
communities might obscure.”5 Historians who take this view of the city, however, have
primarily focused on Lowell as the epicenter of industrialization and one of the earliest

4

Kimberly Philips-Fein, “1973 to the Present,” in American History Now, eds. Eric Foner and Lisa McGirr
(Philadelphia, Temple University Press, 2011), 190.
5
Marc Miller, The Irony of Victory: World War II and Lowell, Massachusetts (Urbana, IL: University of
Illinois Pres, 1988), viii.
4

sites of deindustrialization and heritage-based urban renewal. Their analyses have not yet
followed these threads into the Reagan era when refugees from U.S. wars in Southeast
Asia grew to be over one-third of Lowell’s population, and permanently altered the
demographics, politics, and culture of the city. Put more simply, this thesis examines the
relationship between urban poverty, welfare, warfare, and refugee populations in Lowell,
Massachusetts in the period 1975-1985.
Local History and Cold War Militarism
Any analysis of refugees and work in Lowell, Massachusetts is tied to the broader
history of the military-industrial complex and urban environments. The relationship
between militarism and urban communities throughout the twentieth century has been, if
not well-studied, then certainly firmly established. Historian Roger Lotchin argued that
prior to the twentieth century the relationship was “episodic,” but after World War I and
World War II “the U.S. military became more prominent, and its impacts on U.S. cities
have become more permanent.”6 Several important studies, particularly by
anthropologists Catherine Lutz and June Nash, have traced the long-term relationship
between cities—Fayetteville, Arkansas and Pittsfield, Massachusetts, respectively--and
the military.7 The impact of Cold War militarism on cities, however, has only recently
been considered. Historians have, however, produced a wealth of scholarship examining
the impact of domestic affairs on foreign relations during the Cold War.
Yet, as Jeffrey and Katherine Engel argued in the introduction to their recent
collection, Local Consequences of the Global Cold War, diplomatic and international

6

Roger W. Lotchin ed., The Martial Metropolis: U.S. Cities in War and Peace (New York: Praeger, 1984),
xi.
7
June Nash, From Tank Town to High-Tech: The Clash of Communities and Industrial Cycles (Albany,
NY: State University of New York Press, 1989),
5

historians tended to avoid “the reverse: the impact of international affairs on people.”8
The authors asserted, “foreign affairs and geopolitics affect communities and lives as
much as the other way around,” and offered their volume as a series of case studies aimed
at breaking this ground.9 Of course, as the authors note, scholars in disciplines outside of
diplomatic and international history have approached the impacts of the Cold War on the
daily lives of Americans. In Homeward Bound: American Families in the Cold War Era
Elaine Tyler May, historian of gender, sexuality and the family, argued that the home
served as the domestic site of the containment imperative in foreign policy.10
Although historians such as May have examined the local impacts of the Cold
War on the family and race relations, scholars have focused less on the local impacts of
increased military spending, which climbed from $14 billion in 1949 to over $300 billion
by the end of the Reagan administration. In America’s Cold War: The Politics of
Insecurity, historians Campbell Craig and Fredrik Logevall noted the literature on what
President Eisenhower famously termed the military-industrial complex remains “thin.”11
In their work Craig and Logevall argued that the military industrial complex emerged not
just as a by-product of the Cold War, but instead acted as a force propelling its
continuation long after the United States had secured its international position vis-à-vis
the Soviet Union. Craig and Logevall asserted that after the early 1950s, despite the
United States’ ever-expanding military budget, the USSR no longer posed a serious threat
to the United States. According to Craig and Logevall the military-industrial complex
8

Jeffrey Engel, ed., Local Consequences of the Global Cold War (Washington, D.C.: Woodrow Wilson
Center Press, 2007), 2.
9
Engel, ed., Local Consequences, 3.
10
Elaine Tyler May, Homeward Bound: American Families in the Cold War Era (New York: Basic Books,
1998).
11
Campbell Craig and Fredrik Logevall, America’s Cold War: The Politics of Insecurity (Cambridge,
Massachusetts: Belknap Press of Harvard University, 2009), 373 n12.
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“became a power within itself, a vested interest largely outside the perimeter of
democratic control, and arguably the single greatest factor in the post-1941 economic life
of the United States.”12 The authors argued that U.S. presidents, particularly after
Truman, were “overwhelmed by a logic of bipolar overkill and Keynesian spending.”13
If the historical literature on the military-industrial complex is “thin,” as Craig
and Logevall assert, then even less attention has been devoted to the role of military
spending in regional and local economies. When the Cold War military industrial
complex came to Lowell, for instance, it did not come in the form of military bases,
weapons systems, or weapons manufacturers, which are the focus of the most compelling
localized studies of Cold War militarism. In The Missile Next Door: The Minutemen in
the American Heartland, historian Gretchen Heefner asserted that historians “have yet to
come to terms with the centrality of the Cold War defense establishment.”14 In her study
Heefner focused on “the intimate and surprising ways the national security state
transformed society and politics in the United States.”15 Her research traced the
development of the Minuteman Missile Program from its inception in the 1950s to its
demise in the 1990s. The program buried strategic nuclear arms, to be used in a potential
escalation of the conflict with the USSR, on the land of American farmers across the
Mid-West. Heefner asserted the decision to bury the weapons in isolated regions allowed
U.S. citizens to have a massive deterrent against the Soviet Union without acknowledging
the consequences.

12

Craig and Logevall, America’s Cold War, 7-8.
Craig and Logevall, America’s Cold War, 361.
14
Gretchen Heefner, The Missile Next Door: The Minutemen in the American Heartland (Cambridge, MA:
Harvard University Press, 2012), 11.
15
Heefner, The Missile Next Door, 6.
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Conclusion
During a newspaper interview in the midst of the 1990 race for the governor’s
office in Massachusetts, Democratic nominee John Silber demanded to know, on behalf
of the state’s voters, “Why should Lowell be the Cambodian capital of America?”16
Speaking rhetorically, Silber went on to answer his own question saying, “We [the state
of Massachusetts] are running a welfare magnet…Either the access to welfare here is
easier…or the benefits are better, or you can’t explain why people are moving…to
Massachusetts.”17 The Cambodian Mutual Aid Association (CMAA) in Lowell quickly
went on the defensive and insisted, “Our goal at the CMAA is to ensure that all who are
able-bodied…will enter the work force and enjoy the riches and security of the American
dream in the city of Lowell.”18 In all the debate that followed Silber’s remarks, welfare
dependency and workforce participation remained the unquestioned metrics by which
refugees were judged and found wanting.
Silber, however, fundamentally misunderstood the sequence of events that
brought so many Southeast Asian refugees to the state. When Blong Xiong arrived in
Lowell, Massachusetts, he did so as a result of U.S. Cold War foreign policy imperatives
and as one of thousands attracted by the promise of employment in the city’s booming
high-tech sector, also a result of the Cold War. The high-tech sector proved volatile and
collapsed in the early 1990s as military funding declined and many of the region’s
companies failed to remain competitive. While Xiong’s job survived, by 1992 the
majority of Cambodian and Hmong refugees who worked in electronics assembly found
themselves unemployed and reliant on welfare benefits for survival. In this thesis I

16

Telegram and Gazette, January 25, 1990.
Telegram and Gazette, January 25 1990.
18
Telegram and Gazette, January 27, 1990.
17

8

conclude the policy imperative for refugees to find employment as quickly as possible
served to create a new low-skill, low-wage working class.

9

CHAPTER 2
THE INDOCHINESE REFUGEE FOUNDATION, 1976-1980
The evacuation of American forces from Saigon in 1975 touched off the first of
what would become multiple refugee crises following the American wars in Southeast
Asia.1 Within a year the American Fund for Czechoslovakian Refugees (AFCR), one of
nine non-governmental voluntary agencies contracted with the State Department to
manage the resettlement of refugees from Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos to the United
States, had resettled nearly 1,000 refugees in the Boston area.2 In early 1976, a group of
thirty-seven of these refugees from Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos gathered in Boston to
form the Indochinese Refugee Foundation (IRF). The founders envisioned the IRF as a
privately funded, mutual assistance organization dedicated to offering a range of social
services to recently arrived refugees. By 1979 the organization had plans to expand
operations into nearby Lowell as voluntary agencies shifted resettlement to the
1

On the Vietnam Wars see, Christian Appy, Patriots: the Vietnam War Remembered from All Sides (New
York: Viking Press, 2003), Elizabeth Becker, When the War Was Over: Cambodia and the Khmer Rouge
Revolution (New York: Public Affairs, 1998), Timothy Castle, At War in the Shadow of Vietnam: US
Military Aid to the Royal Lao Government, 1955-1975 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993),
David Chandler, The Tragedy of Cambodian History: Politics, War, and Revolution since 1945 (New
Haven: Yale University Press, 1991), Jessica M Chapman, Cauldron of Resistance: Ngo Dinh Diem, the
United States, and 1950s Southern Vietnam (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2013), Kenton Clymer,
Troubled Relations: the United States and Cambodia since 1870 (Dekalb, IL: University of Illinois Press,
2007), Kenneth Conboy, Shadow War: the CIA’s Secret War in Laos (Boulder, CO: Paladin Press, 1995),
Kenneth Conboy, The Cambodian Wars: Clashing Armies and CIA Covert Operations (Lawrence, Kansas:
University of Kansas Press, 2013), Seth Jacobs, The University Unraveling: American Foreign Policy in
Cold War Laos (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2012), Ben Kiernan, How Pol Pot Came to Power: A
History of Communism in Kampuchea, 1930-1975 (London: Verso Books, 1985), Jeffrey Kimball, The
Vietnam War Files: Uncovering the Secret History of Nixon-Era Strategy, Modern War Studies (Lawrence:
University Press of Kansas, 2004)Fredrik Logevall, Embers of War: The Fall of an Empire and the Making
of America's Vietnam (New York: Random House, 2012), George Herring, America's Longest War: The
United States and Vietnam, 1950-1975 (Boston: McGraw-Hill, 2002), George C. Herring, LBJ and
Vietnam: A Different Kind of War: An Administrative History of the Johnson Presidency Series (Austin:
University of Texas Press, 1994), Fredrik Logevall, Choosing War: The Lost Chance for Peace and the
Escalation of War in Vietnam (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1999), Lien-Hang T Nguyen,
Hanoi’s War: An International History of the War for Peace in Vietnam (Chapel Hill: University of North
Carolina Press, 2012), William Rust, Before the Quagmire: American Intervention in Laos, 1954-1961
(Lexington, KY: University of Kentucky Press, 2012),
2
Sr. Nguyen Thi Vinh to Truong P Tran, June 8, 1979, IRF Papers, Box 11, Folder 12.
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Merrimack River Valley. Hai Ba Pho, a co-founder of the organization who lived in the
Lowell area, described its original mission saying, “The Foundation has a dual
purpose…to inform the public of the critical situation of refugees in Southeast Asia, and
as a mutual help group to give moral and social support to Indochinese who settle in [the
Boston] region.”3 Although the organization had a broad social service mandate, its
services focused on employment training and English-language instruction for the job
market.
This chapter situates the resettlement of Southeast Asian refugees in the greater
Boston area within the broader history of refugee admissions in the United States. It is
structured in three parts to model the path an individual refugee would have followed
before being resettled in the US and encountering the IRF. It argues that the IRF’s focus
on employment and language training was not simply a local phenomenon. Instead, over
the course of the IRF’s first four years 1976-1980, refugee policy at the federal level
increasingly focused on employment and English-language training for the labor market
as the metrics of successful resettlement programs. By 1980 this focus had coalesced into
a coherent policy imperative and became codified into law by the 1980 Refugee Act.
The first part, out of the control and sight of an individual but perhaps the most
central to the refugee experience, examines the multi-tiered, ad-hoc federal admissions
process in place before 1980 Refugee Act regularized admissions. This convoluted
process originated during European refugee crises following World War II, and took
definitive shape in the growing Cold War need to admit refugees beneficial to the US’s
ideological fight against communism. Under the parole provisions of the 1952
3

Hai B. Pho to Roger Ler, March 21, 1980, ????
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Immigration and Naturalization Act, the attorney general, at the behest of the president,
paroled broad groups of potential refugees in exceptional circumstances, such as exiled
Hungarians involved in the 1956 uprising against the USSR. The crises in Southeast Asia
following the American evacuation of Saigon in 1975 and continuing in to the early
1980s, however, proved too widespread for the ad-hoc system. This chapter argues that
the 1980 Refugee Act, which regularized admissions, also emerged, at least in part, as a
measure to stem and control the flow of refugees from Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos.
This part also examines the role of the State Department, Immigration and
Naturalization Services (INS), and cultural orientation centers, all of which served as
middle points for refugees between leaving the camps, and arriving in the US. Although
admission power broadly rested with the federal government, decision-making power at
the level of whether or not to admit an individual refugee within a paroled group rested
with the State Department, along with Immigration and Naturalization Services (INS).
Once approved, however, refugees were often not sent directly to the US. Instead they
went to cultural orientation centers in the Philippines which sought to “transform”
refugees into productive American citizens and workers. The third part asks how and why
the AFCR designated Boston and Lowell as resettlement sites by exploring the central
role of voluntary agencies in the resettlement process. Although the federal government
held the power to admit refugees, voluntary agencies were tasked with managing all
aspects of resettlement.
Refugee Admissions
Historians and policy analysts have expended considerable effort analyzing
federal admissions policy, but have neglected to examine locally run resettlement

12

organizations such as the IRF for several key reasons. First, it is the tendency of
historians and policy analysts to limit themselves to asking how U.S. refugee admissions
policy has, or has not, lived up to the nation’s stated humanitarian ideals. These studies
have reached two broad, and contradictory, conclusions. Analysts Gil Loescher and John
Scanlan argued that foreign policy imperatives “played the key role in determining which
refugees [were] permitted to enter the United States.”4 They concluded that a “calculated
kindness” at the heart of U.S. refugee policy led the nation’s executive to regularly permit
entry of individuals fleeing from communism, in particular Hungary and Cuba (19601966), as well as Southeast Asia after 1975. Refugees from authoritarian allies, such as
Haiti and El Salvador, however, were detained, denied asylum and deported when they
arrived on American shores.
Alternatively, historian Carl Bon Tempo Jr. recognized the “tricky and shifting
calculus” of domestic politics, foreign policy, and economic factors that factored into the
formation of refugee policy, and acknowledged that refugees often served as public
relations pieces in the ideological Cold War.5 Yet, Bon Tempo argued that the fall of
Vietnam inspired a “reinvigoration of a human rights movement” in U.S. refugee
admissions policy, which led to the admission of Soviet, Chilean and Indochinese
refugees.6 According to Bon Tempo, the “American duty to defend and protect human
rights” became the cornerstone of American refugee admissions policy as expressed in
the 1980 Refugee Act, which removed the Cold War commitment to only admit refugees

4

Gil Loescher and John Scanlan, Calculated Kindness: Refugees and America’s Half-Open Door, 1945 to
the Present (New York: The Free Press, 1986), xvii.
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Carl Bon Tempo Jr., Americans at the Gate: The United States and Refugees during the Cold War
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2008), 1.
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from communism.7 Bon Tempo concluded, however, that the human rights promise of the
1980 Refugee Act proved short-lived as the “Reagan White House’s
administration….betrayed the law’s promise.”8 In Bon Tempo’s analysis the “calculated
kindness” identified by earlier scholars did not sit uncontested at the core refugee
admissions policy. Instead, it waxed and waned within changing political and economic
contexts.
Most significantly, Bon Tempo pointed out that immigration history “suffers from
a blind spot when it comes to refugees; more often than not, the refugee story is left
unaddressed or subsumed under the immigrant story.”9 Policy analysts Norman and
Naomi Zucker reinforced this observation. They concluded that refugees garnered little
congressional support or attention outside of their use as publicity pieces in the
ideological Cold War. The Zuckers argued that while the 1965 Hart-Celler Act, passed as
a part of Lyndon B. Johnson’s Civil Rights reforms to liberalize immigration policy,
abolished quotas and allowed immigrants from Asia, Latin America, and Africa to enter
the U.S, Congress “attached little importance to the admission of refugees, placing them
seventh-last-in the preference system and giving refugees the smallest proportion (only
six percent….) of all entrants.”10 The Zuckers concluded that refugees remained largely
an afterthought in the broader scope of American immigration policy.
The refugees who arrived from Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos in the 1970s were,
as Bon Tempo aptly pointed out, not immigrants, and the failure to make that distinction
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has two important implications. First, as social scientist Michael Truong argued, refugees
from Southeast Asia arrived in the U.S. after “decades of failed U.S. foreign policy” in
the region.11 Neglecting this distinction exonerates the U.S.’s “role and responsibility in
creating and sustaining the ‘refugee conditions’ in the first place.”12 Although often
touted by the media and political leaders as refugees from communism, refugees from
Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos were just as much refugees from wars directly and
indirectly a result of US Cold War policy in the region dating from before the French
defeat. Indeed, without U.S. wars in the region there may never have been refugee crises
in the region. Conflating refugees with immigrants serves to obscure the central role that
U.S. foreign policy generally, and U.S. militarism more specifically, play in spurring
large population movements.
Second, as anthropologist and former head of the Office of Refugee Resettlement
David Haines noted, the “American notion of a new life for refugees- that refugees are
also immigrants,” has focused resettlement on avoiding welfare dependence and ensuring
rapid participation in the workforce.13 In this analysis, the U.S. gave refugees a “second
chance” and placed intense pressure on the recipients of American benevolence to live up
to that privilege by participating in the workforce and learning the English language.
Although these may seem rather benign goals, they are intertwined with broader
historical narratives that use work, both the ability and the desire, as one factor by which
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to judge individuals as worthy or unworthy for citizenship and social inclusion. As early
as 1882 immigrants were denied entry to the United States if it could be determined they
were “likely to become a public charge.” As historian Deirdre Moloney has argued,
“Beginning in the Progressive Era, poverty has often served as a more convenient
administrative device for deporting immigrants who were viewed as unfit for future
American citizenship.”14
Although sensationalized coverage of the Vietnamese “boat people” put refugee
admissions policy under a temporary spotlight, refugees had never historically been a
priority within the U.S.’s immigration policy. Prior to the end of World War II, refugees,
unlike immigrants who faced strict quotas but could gain admissions, found themselves
barred from the United States. As historian Mae Ngai has pointed out, “restriction laws of
the 1920s were aimed at stemming migration from war-torn Europe.” As fascism and
anti-Semitism overtook Europe during the 1930s, the United Sates continued its stubborn
refusal to accept refugees. In the wake of World War II, however, the U.S. emerged as
the world’s sole standing superpower. President Truman recognized that he and Congress
needed to handle the eight million refugees in Europe humanely--although not the
millions more in Asia, or they risked compromising the nation’s emerging position as a
world leader.
Until the Civil Rights legislation under President Lyndon B. Johnson, U.S.
lawmakers and politicians also proved unable to build the broad support required to
regularize refugee admissions. Instead, situationally-based policies emerged under which
the federal government admitted refugees in one of two ways: under ad-hoc legislation
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responding on a crisis by crisis basis, or under the parole provisions, also on a crisis by
crisis basis. Ad hoc legislation first emerged with the 1948 Displaced Persons Act, which
passed to expand the role of the U.S. in managing the resettlement of Europe’s refugees.
The Act, despite its liberal intentions, admitted less than a quarter million Europeans, and
charged the admissions against future quotas. Refugee affairs were merged with
immigration affairs in the 1952 Immigration and Naturalization Act. The Act relaxed
racially-based restrictions against immigrants from Asia and Africa, but refugees were
scarcely mentioned. The Act did, however, grant the obscure “power of parole” to the
U.S. attorney general, which allowed the attorney general to admit individuals into the
U.S., “for emergent reasons or for reasons deemed strictly in the public interest.”15
Hungary’s 1956 revolution, and the U.S. response to Hungarian refugees, marked the
emergence of the attorney general’s power of parole as the primary force in refugee
admissions.
According to CIA historian James Callanan, the CIA encouraged Hungarian
resistance groups beginning in 1953 through radio propaganda. After the resistance
sparked an uprising against the U.S.S.R., the CIA-sponsored radio broadcasts implied
that the U.S. might provide military support if the uprising continued.16 Of course,
President Eisenhower and military leadership planned to do no such thing, and the
U.S.S.R. violently repressed the uprising. The CIA’s covert actions, however, led
Eisenhower to feel, according to Loescher and Scanlan, “a heavy burden of blame” when
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the uprising failed.17 Citing the obscure “power of parole,” the Eisenhower administration
allowed 32,000 Hungarians to enter the U.S. in excess of immigration quotas. Loescher
and Scanlan argued that after the uprising, “foreign policy choices…played the key role
in determining which refugees will be permitted to enter the United States.”18 More to the
point, the uprising marked the first of many instances in which the U.S. admitted refugees
in the wake of failed covert operations in communist nations. Loescher and Scanlan
concluded, “The politics of failed liberation yielded as their surprising fruit a new,
executive-dominated method of bringing refugees to the United States.”19 Over the next
thirty-five years, guilt over failed military operations, coupled with the power of parole,
became the primary mechanism through which refugees deemed useful to the fight
against communism were admitted into the United States.
The most important challenges to Cold War refugee admissions came during the
Cuban and Southeast Asian crises. The Cuban case began in 1958, following the
communist revolution led by Fidel Castro. The Cuban refugee crisis occurred in four
waves, which began immediately following the revolution. During the first phase,
approximately 100,000 officials and personal friends of deposed dictator Fulgencio
Batista fled for the United States. These refugees were from the “upper and upper-middle
classes, they were owners and managers of large firms, professionals, [and] merchants.”20
This wave slowed, and stopped entirely when the U.S. formally severed diplomatic
relations with communist Cuba in 1961. The second wave began in the interim period
between the end of diplomatic relations and the Cuban missile crisis when over 150,000
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Cubans entered the United States. The third phase lasted from 1962 and concluded in
1965 when Fidel Castro changed policy to let Cubans depart for the U.S. The final phase
lasted until 1973 when the U.S. “withdrew from an agreement that governed the arrival of
Cubans.”21 During all four phases, which totaled half a million people, the attorney
general, under the provisions of the 1952 Immigration and Nationality Act, paroled
refugees without the appropriate visas. Although the total number of refugees admitted
from Cuba proved unprecedented, refugees remained relatively concentrated in Miami,
Florida. Consequently, no widespread support developed for more comprehensive, and
streamlined admissions procedures. Throughout the duration of the Cuban resettlement
program, refugees remained an exceptional circumstance to be dealt with on a case by
case, ad-hoc basis. Just as the Cuban refugee crisis wound down, another began in
Southeast Asia, however, which would force fundamental changes in refugee admissions
policy.
Refugees, and population movements more broadly, were long features of the
Vietnam War. As sociologist Jeremy Hein noted, “America’s…history of intervention in
Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia began and ended with refugees.”22 Hein referred to
Operation Passage to Freedom, which the U.S. Navy launched in 1954 to transport
800,000 French-allied Vietnamese to South Vietnam following partition. Hein
insightfully showed migrations were not an unintended byproduct of U.S wars in the
region, but rather one of the key strategies in victory.23 Historians have generally divided
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the refugee crises during the Vietnam War into three phases.24 The first occurred during
American involvement in Vietnam, from 1965-1975. By 1971 U.S. military activity in
Laos and Vietnam had spurred a flow of over 700,000 refugees.25 The second occurred
following the evacuation of Saigon, lasting from May 1975-December 1976. As the
South Vietnamese government increasingly appeared as though it would fall, the U.S.
planned to evacuate over 12,000 Vietnamese who worked directly for or with the U.S.
Only a few months later, President Ford authorized the evacuation of 200,000
Vietnamese, who the attorney general then paroled into the U.S.
The final wave of refugees began in the middle of 1977 and lasted until
approximately 1983 and included the Vietnamese “boat people,” and the hundreds of
thousands of Cambodians who fled following the Vietnamese invasion in 1979.When the
South Vietnamese government collapsed in 1975, the Pathet Lao took control of Laos,
while the Khmer Rouge took power in Cambodia. In 1978 President Carter approved
admissions of a meager 7,000, given the tens of thousands fleeing, with the promise of
admitting another 25,000 in 1979. As the crisis worsened, President Carter moved to
increase the number of refugees settled each month to over 14,000. By 1980 there were
nearly half a million refugees from Cambodia and Laos living in refugee camps in
Thailand, which was often the country of first asylum. By that same year, the U.S. had
admitted over 400,000 refugees from Southeast Asia.26
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Bon Tempo concluded that, “The United States had no overarching foreign policy
interests at stake in allowing the Vietnamese refugees to enter the United States.”27 Yet,
this interpretation has not gone unchallenged. Sociologist Yen Le Espiritu has argued that
refugees, from Vietnam in particular, served as cultural symbols around which
Americans could resolve the “difficult memory” of the Vietnam War. According to Le
Espiritu the War left the U.S. “neither a victor no liberator….the U.S. had no ‘liberated’
country or people to showcase….in the absence…the U.S. media appear[ed] to have
produced a substitute: the freed…Vietnamese refugee.”28 Le Espiritu’s argument is
backed up by the reception of refugees in Lowell. One resident described importance of
the refugees newly arrived in the city saying, ““First, politically, each refugee from
Indochina is a vote of vindication of the U.S. foreign policy is Southeast Asia and a ballot
of approval of the social system here.”29 Yet, as the memory of the Vietnam War faded,
so too did the sympathetic capital that refugees could draw on. By the early 1990s
refugees in Lowell were criticized for their dependency far more than they were revered
as symbols of the American righteousness in the fight against communism.
Although a refugee’s experience hinged on recognition by the president and
attorney general, that decision only comprised the very first step for individual refugees
who faced their greatest challenges in the process of resettlement.30 For Southeast Asian
refugees, the resettlement process started in refugee camps run by the UN in Thailand.
Officials from U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) interviewed refugees
27
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to determine whether they had ever been a member of the communist party, and less
importantly, whether they were likely to become a public charge once resettled. Refugees
who had often spent years in Thai camps described the interviews as nerve-wracking.
U.S. officials routinely rejected refugees who they considered likely to become a public
charge, or who they suspected of harboring communist sympathies, despite the
availability of waivers for refugees in these categories.31 The harsh selection process had
profound consequences. For example, although nearly half a million Cambodians fled to
Thailand from 1983-1985, the U.S. accepted only fifty thousand.
Although INS held responsibility for the initial selection of refugees to be
resettled, the work of ensuring Southeast Asian refugees were worthy, economically selfsufficient citizens began with cultural orientation centers in the Philippines, which often
followed the initial interview.32 According to anthropologist Carol Mortland, refugees
completed six months of English-language and cultural programming in order to be made
“into economically self-sufficient and well-adjusted members of the United States.”33
Staff at refugee processing centers in the Philippines aimed to create “transformed
refugees” who would arrive in the U.S. speaking rudimentary English sufficient for the
low-wage segment of the labor market, ready to accept any such employment without
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complaint, and determined to refuse welfare.34 Despite the aspirations of cultural
orientation, however, when refugees arrived in a new country they needed, at the absolute
bare minimum, transitional assistance.
Refugee Resettlement
Once selected, one of the eleven voluntary, non-governmental agencies the U.S.
government contracted to manage resettlement interviewed the refugee in Thai camps run
by the UN and compiled a biographical data sheet. The data sheet was then transmitted to
an umbrella organization, the American Council of Voluntary Agencies, in New York
City, where the refugee was assigned to a voluntary agency. Once the voluntary agency
accepted the sponsorship it became responsible for resettling the refugee with a sponsor,
either an individual or community. Typically voluntary agencies used paid caseworkers,
or recruited church and civic groups to sponsor refugees. In the earliest resettlement of
Southeast Asian refugees, U.S. veterans of the Vietnam Wars often served as sponsors.
The sponsors were the primary contact for refugees once they arrived in the U.S. The
sponsor provided services including “meeting refugees at the airport, providing
temporary accommodations, arranging for permanent housing, and providing food,
clothing, and other assistance.”35
Voluntary agencies and locally funded organizations historically served as the
cornerstones of the refugee resettlement process. Prior to 1960, eleven voluntary agencies
managed resettlement in its entirety.36 Yet, as specialist in refugee affairs Robin Wright
34
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has noted, “The relationship between VOLAGs (voluntary organizations) and the federal
government has never been well formulated.”37 Immigration legislation failed to include
any mention of voluntary agencies, and never outlined their responsibilities prior to 1980.
The “bifurcated” management of refugee affairs meant that the federal government
accepted no responsibility for the successful resettlement of refugees, beyond initial
screenings and the processing of immigration paperwork. Although the federal
government accepted no formal responsibility, it did not mean that it did not exert any
influence on the priorities of resettlement agencies. The federal government’s chief
concern, and by necessity of the chief concern of voluntary agencies, was that refugees
not become dependents upon the state. During the Hungarian refugee crisis the federal
government made “feverish efforts to reassure Americans”38 that Hungarian refugees
were “good Americans like them in terms of family, gender roles, and employment.”39
Prior to the refugee crises in Southeast Asia, voluntary agencies accepted primary
responsibility for providing transitional assistance and preventing refugee welfare
dependence. This set-up proved successful as refugees entered pre-existing ethnic
communities with extensive aid networks.40 Europeans displaced after World War II,
exiled Hungarian revolutionaries, and similarly exiled Czech radicals could all rely upon
extensive ethnic aid networks upon their arrival. Individuals embedded within strong
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ethnic communities sponsored refugees. The federal government only started to accept
some responsibility for refugees during the Cuban crisis in 1961. These refugees offered
another unparalleled indictment of the USSR; but unlike the Hungarian and Czech
refugees who came before them, Cuban refugees lacked an existing base of ethnic
support in the U.S. Thus Congress passed the Migration and Refugee Assistance Act of
1962, which established an expansive public aid system for newly arrived refugees from
Cuba.41
The precedent set by the 1962 Act proved central to the creation of the
Indochinese Migration and Refugee Assistance Act, which President Gerald Ford signed
into law on May 23, 1975.42 The Act offered the same set of services to Southeast Asian
refugees as had been offered to Cuban refugees. Importantly, the Act emphasized
English-language and employment related training for those refugees.43 The American
Fund for Czechoslovak Refugees (AFCR) resettled the majority of refugees of all
ethnicities/nationalities who arrived in Boston and Lowell following the passage of the
Assistance Act. Dr. Jan Papanek, the Czech representative to the United Nations and
delegate in the U.S. of the Czech Red Cross, founded the organization in 1948 in the
aftermath of WWII. The organization initially provided financial support to displaced
persons in Germany, Austria, Italy, France, Belgium, Switzerland, and Sweden. In 1950
the AFCR partnered with the U.S. government to relocate refugees to the U.S.44 The
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organization also secured employment and paid the travel costs of refugees selected for
resettlement.45
According to historian James Stuart Olson, these early arrivals, largely from
Vietnam, who totaled 170,000 across the nation, tended to be “well-educated…with good
job and professional skills…they had been large landowners, physicians, dentists, [and]
attorneys.”46 Their employment rates in the U.S. sat above the national average and by
1979, only eleven percent used general welfare programs. The Congressional Record
noted, “Most receive supplemental support for just a short period as they find jobs and
attempt to adjust to American society.”47Although the new arrivals in Boston were,
broadly speaking, middle class with high levels of formal education, the IRF noted
refugees from a range of socio-economic backgrounds were being selected for
resettlement. By 1976 over one hundred and thirty refugee families were headed by
individuals reliant on public assistance.48 The IRF’s founders targeted IRF’s social
services at refugees who lacked transferable job skills and formal education who were
trickling into Boston. They planned to, “Modernize the traditional Indochinese folk
system” so the new arrivals could become economically independent citizens.49
Why Lowell, Massachusetts?
Only a handful of the 170,000 refugees were resettled in Lowell. Initially the
American Fund for Czechoslovak Refugees (AFCR), a non-profit agency contracted with
the federal government to manage refugee resettlement, resettled just two families,
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totaling fifteen individuals, in the city. By 1979 approximately two hundred Vietnamese
refugees lived in Lowell. The AFCR noted the availability of cheap housing, and the
abundance of entry-level jobs available in the city and surrounding towns. These first
arrivals had worked for the U.S. government during the war and were sponsored by local
veterans. Similar to those who were resettled in the Boston area, they generally had high
levels of formal education and were capable of quickly regaining self-sufficiency with
minimal state support.50
Prior to 1976 it is unlikely that Lowell could have been, in any analysis, an
attractive option for resettlement agencies. In the early 1970s Lowell, and the state of
Massachusetts more broadly, were mired in more than three decades of economic decline
that began in the early 1920s when the region’s once thriving textile industry moved to
the American South in search of superior technology, cheaper labor, and lower operating
costs.51 Although textiles revived moderately during the run-ups to World War II, Korea,
and Vietnam, the city’s production levels never again reached the heights of the late
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. From 1968-1975, Massachusetts lost 252,000
manufacturing jobs.52 From 1975-1980, however, the state’s businesses created 225,000
manufacturing jobs in what state officials labeled the “Massachusetts Miracle.”53 They
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attributed the turn-around to a boom in the high-tech sector, particularly in computers and
electronics, which in many cases, were spin-off corporations from the research
universities in the Boston area.54 In this new “knowledge” economy, highly trained
engineers and scientists would revitalize the state economy.
Yet, as economist Anne Markuson pointed out, “the industrial recovery [in
Massachusetts] of the 1970s and early 1980s… [was] overwhelmingly defense based.”
Indeed, Markuson’s research demonstrated Massachusetts ranked second only to
California when it came to securing prime contracts from the Department of Defense.55
According to Markuson, defense funding remapped the economic landscape of the U.S,
dissolved old regional blocs, and formed what she termed the “Gunbelt.” For
Massachusetts, as historian Jack Tager pointed out, “The Cold War, the Korean War, and
the Vietnam conflict advanced the prosperity of a state geared toward developing and
producing highly specialized defense goods.”56 Defense funding initially moved into the
state via World War II avionics industries. The federal government constructed facilities
for firms such as General Electric and then sold the buildings back to the corporations at
less than market value when the war ended. During the avionics boom of the 1950s and
1960s, the region’s population and employment expanded at rates exceeding national
rates. A recession in the mid-1970s temporarily halted this growth, but increasing defense
investment in high-tech electronics moved Massachusetts to the lead in the research,
development, and production of high-technology goods, particularly minicomputers.
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The city of Lowell had a high stake in the continued military funding of high-tech
industries. During the 1970s, when Lowell consistently led the nation in unemployment
with rates surpassing fifteen percent, city officials and planners, led by Mayor Patrick
Mogan and Senator Paul Tsongas, secured federal and state funding to “brand” the city’s
history into a series of cultural attractions (museums, the national park, arts districts,
outdoor festivals, etc.). Mogan and Tsongas insisted this would rejuvenate the city and
attract new residents and businesses.57 For a time their vision seemed correct. The city’s
“culture led revitalization” attracted a host of new retailers, hotels, and high-technology
firms. Local Defense Department funded high tech firms such as Wang Labs, New
England Instrument, Digital Equipment Corporation, and Raytheon labs proved central
components of the city’s revitalization.
By 1982 such firms represented twenty four percent of the region’s employment,
as compared to ten percent for the state and four percent for the nation. Although
approximately twenty percent of workers in these firms were skilled, more than thirty
percent were unskilled or low-skilled.58 More importantly, low-skilled and unskilled
workers in Massachusetts were a comparative bargain. Employers took advantage of “the
low wages forced upon a population which had long faced and declining industrial sector
and industrial flight.”59 In Massachusetts these workers earned less than all but their
counterparts in the rural south. The AFCR looked to Lowell as a suitable site because the
city boasted cheap housing and an increasing number of unskilled, entry level jobs in the
rising electronics assembly industry.
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Conclusion: The 1980 Refugee Act
By 1979, just as refugees began to flow into Lowell in larger numbers, the
bifurcated, “patchwork quilt” of assistance provided by the federal government and
voluntary agencies unraveled.60 In 1978 Vietnam invaded Cambodia and defeated the
Khmer Rouge, which sparked massive flight from Cambodia into Thailand. These new
refugees, on the whole, lacked formal education and transferable jobs skills. Further,
insufficient time had passed since the first wave of Vietnamese refugees to establish aid
networks in the U.S.; thus, this new wave of refugees did not find employment as
quickly, and often remained on welfare for extended periods. Two reports by the U.S.
General Accounting Office outlined the challenges posed by new refugees. The first,
issued in 1977, “noted refugees increased dependence on public assistance and other
problems relating to…progress toward self-sufficiency.”61 The second, issued in 1979
claimed that voluntary agencies were not adequately tracking rates of self-sufficiency.
The report “concluded that the lack of a consistent refugee policy had made it difficult for
voluntary agencies and service providers to plan for and establish programs for the
effective resettlement of refugees.”62 By 1980 sixty four percent of all Southeast Asian
refugee households were on public assistance, a rate three times that of AfricanAmericans and four times that of Latinos.63 Federal lawmakers, including Senator
Edward Kennedy of Massachusetts, began drafting legislation to address these issues.
The 1980 Refugee Act, which amended the 1962 Migration and Refugee
Assistance Act, aimed to solve these problems. The Act ended ad-hoc admissions,
60

Haines, Refugees in America, 12.
U. S. GAO, Greater Emphasis, 2.
62
U. S. GAO, Greater Emphasis, 2.
63
Edward and John Park, Probationary Americans: Contemporary Immigration Policies and the Shaping
of Asian American Communities (New York: Routledge, 2005), 39.
61

30

adopted the U.N. definition of refugee, formalized asylum, and established federally
funded post-arrival aid in the Department of Health and Human Services. The Act also
codified economic self-sufficiency as the metric of resettlement success, which it defined
as quickly moving refugees from the welfare rolls to the labor market. Although the Act
established federal aid programs, it favored public-private partnerships and vested
authority to manage day-to-day resettlement at the state and local levels. The mandates of
the 1980 Refugee Act had significant implications when the AFCR planned to increase its
resettlement in Lowell “by a factor of 10.”
Prior to 1980 the State Department and INS were primarily concerned with
restricting admissions to individuals persecuted under communist rule. The 1980 Act,
however, required a stricter admissions process that excluded “economic migrants,”
which placed new emphasis on a refugee’s ability to achieve “economic self-sufficiency”
and avoid being labeled “likely to become a public charge.” This chapter contends that
concerns about dependency and economic self-sufficiency increased markedly in
response to demographic shifts in refugees from Southeast Asia. Refugees from
Cambodia and Laos, often with less formal education, and without pre-existing ethnic
communities in the US, forced changes in the relationships between voluntary agencies,
privately funded non-profits, and the federal government. Increasing concerns about
refugees “likely to become a public charge” led federal lawmakers, and by extension
social service providers such as the IRF, to prioritize paid wage labor in its programs.
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CHAPTER 3
THE INDOCHINESE SELF-HELP PROJECT, 1980-1982
The economic self-sufficiency mandate of the 1980 Refugee Act proved to be a
turning point, not only for federal policy, but also for the Boston-based Indochinese
Refugee Foundation. By August 1980, the American Fund for Czechoslovakian Refugees
(AFCR) and the American Council for Nationality Services (ANCS) had followed
through on their plans to increase the number of refugees, primarily from Cambodia and
Laos that they resettled in Lowell. Over the course of the last six months of 1979 the
population climbed precipitously from less than one hundred to over one thousand. Hai
Ba Pho, a co-founder of the IRF and Vietnamese refugee living in nearby Chelmsford,
watched the efforts of the voluntary agencies uneasily. As the number of refugees in the
city topped one thousand Pho noted that Lowell’s social service institutions were proving
unprepared and unequipped to adequately service the needs of these newest residents.
Jacqueline Fidler, a social service worker in Lowell described the situation,
saying, “This dramatic influx of unskilled refugees put a tremendous drain on the city's
resources.”1 As a result, refugees increasingly relied on welfare for their survival. In the
analysis of Pho, Fidler, and city officials, the lack of social services would inevitably lead
to the creation of a new welfare dependent class in the city. Further, tensions between
native residents and refugees increased as Cambodians and Hmong became more visible
in local schools and in the local job market. Although Pho recognized that Lowell needed
an organization such as the IRF to ease community tensions by assisting refugees in
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rapidly achieving “economic self-sufficiency,” he also recognized that the needs of
Lowell’s population exceeded the IRF’s capabilities as a privately-funded organization.
To overcome this obstacle, the IRF seized on the federal funding recently
mandated by the 1980 Refugee Act for resettlement social services, and submitted a
request for funding to the newly created Federal Office of Refugee Resettlement (FORR).
The proposal outlined a plan to expand the IRF’s services from greater Boston to include
the greater Lowell area. The IRF won the grant and secured a year of funding to launch
what it titled the “Indochinese Self-Help Project,” which followed the “economic selfsufficiency” mandate of the 1980 Refugee Act and proposed work as the fundamental
means to ease the trouble just visible on Lowell’s horizon.
Situating Economic Self-Sufficiency
By 1984 eight hundred organizations similar in mission to the IRF had formed
across the U.S.2 These organizations, while often federally funded under the 1980
Refugee Act, formed and operated at the local level, reflect the intertwining of national
and local politics, which has characterized Southeast Asian refugee policy since the U.S.
began admitting refugees following the American evacuation of Saigon in 1975. Refugee
policy comprises two distinct, but overlapping, processes: refugee admissions and
refugee resettlement policies. Refugee admissions policy, discussed at length in Chapter
One, is used to determine who qualifies as a refugee, and delineates the criteria used to
determine who gains admissions to the United States. Refugee admissions policy has
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historically been determined at the federal level, divorced from the communities selected
by voluntary agencies as new homes for admitted refugees. Although refugee
resettlement policy is broadly set by federal legislation such as the 1980 Refugee Act’s
economic self-sufficiency mandate, authority for day-to-day operations is diffused to the
state and local levels. Yet, little attention has been paid to the local side of this equation.
This chapter traces the first year of the IRF’s expansion into Lowell in order to
interrogate “economic self-sufficiency,” the unquestioned precept of resettlement policy
codified in the 1980 Refugee Act. Broadly conceived, this chapter is concerned with
discerning which social service programs the Refugee Act’s emphasis on economic selfsufficiency nurtured, which it foreclosed, and what this meant for the refugees trying to
find their footing in an unfamiliar and, at times, unwelcoming, new world. To critically
interrogate the prioritization of economic self-sufficiency within the Indochinese Refugee
Foundation’s programming, this thesis draws on two scholars. First, it builds on Aihwa
Ong’s assertion that state power in the U.S. is not an “overarching…apparatus,” but
instead “a multiplicity of networks through which various authorities….translate
democratic goals in relation to target populations.”3 Although the IRF modeled its
programming after federal legislation, it independently developed its own strategies for
encouraging economic self-sufficiency, and for interacting with refugees and the broader
community.
Thus the IRF represents one network of authority in the life of a refugee. More
particularly, the IRF’s counselors and caseworkers held an immense amount of power
over the lives of the refugees they interacted with. As social scientists Michael Lipsky has
3
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argued, “The ways in which street-level bureaucrats deliver benefits and sanctions
structure and delimit people’s lives and opportunities.”4 In Lipsky’s analysis policy may
be set by federal legislators, but it is really made in the local welfare office, and in each
interaction between caseworker and client. This proved particularly accurate in Lowell. A
given caseworker had the power to determine which jobs refugees would be suited for,
select the refugees they imagined to be best suited to the jobs they did find, while at the
same time deciding a refugee’s eligibility for welfare, foodstamps, housing, and
Medicare. Economic self-sufficiency may have been the goal of federal legislators, but
the IRF determined what that goal meant, and how it would be achieved.
The IRF, then, provides an initial case-study to assess how the 1980 Refugee Act’s
mandate played out at the local level. It concludes that, following the 1980 Refugee Act,
social service providers prioritized “economic self-sufficiency” through employment and
English-language training for the labor market, but tried to embed these priorities within
a broad range of service provisions including housing, medical and translation. By 1982,
however, the election of Ronald Reagan had signaled that the political and economic
landscapes had taken a profoundly conservative turn. The incoming Reagan
administration moved to slash social service spending, including the funding that had
propelled the IRF through its first year in Lowell.
Since the 1980 Refugee Act passed in Congress, state offices, the federal
government, and universities have produced a host of studies to assess refugee economic
self-sufficiency.5 The failure of Southeast Asian refugees, at a population level, to
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achieve economic self-sufficiency was first identified as a social problem to be solved in
the early 1980s. Political scientist Bill Ong Hing wrote, “Nationwide, 64 percent of all
Southeast Asian households headed by refugees arriving after 1980 are on public
assistance.”6 At its most ahistorical, economic self-sufficiency is simply the ability to
support oneself and one’s family by waged labor without turning to outside assistance, in
particular welfare or any other state benefits. In different terms, it is the opposite of
welfare dependency, and in the refugee resettlement process, local, state, and federal
officials viewed work as the means to avoid dependency. Resettlement agencies such as
the IRF, alongside US legislators, envisioned refugees as particularly prone to welfare
dependency, and therefore suited for work in the low-wage, un-skilled or semi-skilled,
and insecure segments of the labor market. In many ways, the second chance offered to
refugees was really a chance to compete with the rest of the American working-class for
jobs in the lowest echelons of work under free market capitalism
These studies were, of course, conducted in the period following the War on
Poverty waged in the 1960s and 1970s, which, according to historian Alice O’Connor,
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collapsed by 1980 due to internal dissension, “growing inequality, wage deterioration,
urban deindustrialization, and a profound [conservative] ideological challenge to the
liberal welfare state.”7 Furthermore, O’Connor contends, by the time refugees were
being resettled in significant numbers in the late 1970s and 1980s, poverty was no longer
viewed in policymaking circles as primarily a structural problem. Instead, policymakers,
organized in an “interlocking network of government agencies, private foundations, and
nonprofit organizations,” increasingly saw poverty as a problem best solved at the
individual level.8 Policymakers “narrowed [their focus] to…understanding the ‘dynamics’
of welfare dependency, the skill deficits of the working poor and the size and
characteristics of the underclass.”9 Although research and discourses about poverty in the
US have largely involved African Americans and other domestic minority groups,
Southeast Asian refugees have also been deeply implicated in narratives of dependency
and debates about the underclass.
Two scholars, anthropologist Aihwa Ong and historian Eric Tang, have pointed
out that Cambodian and Hmong refugees in particular, were deeply implicated in
emerging narratives of dependency and the underclass. For example, in a paper presented
at the 1986 Population Association of America, political scientist Jacqueline Desbarats
presented a paper titled “Cambodian and Laotian Refugees: An Underclass.”10 Ong
suggested that Cambodians in particular were “subject to an ideological blackening”
based on their marked welfare dependence in contrast to the self-sufficiency of the
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Vietnamese counterparts who were culturally coded as “white.”11 Tang, on the other
hand, contended that “refugee exceptionalism” served to “consolidate a homogenous
black culture of poverty.”12 According to Tang, the study of the “economic sociology of
immigration” led by scholars such as Alejandro Portes and Min Zhou argued that AsianAmerican immigrants historically bypassed poverty through their kinship solidarity, and
unbreakable group loyalty. Portes and Zhou argued that African-Americans and other
minority groups in the US tend to lack this community “bounded solidarity.” Southeast
Asian refugees, unlike other Asian-American groups, have struggled with poverty
because the exceptional and traumatic circumstances of their flight and resettlement
disrupted the “bounded solidarity” of their communities. Tang argued that African
American poverty has been pathologized as a product of individual moral failings, rather
than a product of racism embedded in structures which determine access to education,
jobs, and adequate housing. According to Tang, exempting Southeast Asian refugees from
this pathology by arguing the trauma of flight caused their poverty served a similar
function: it made individual experiences the root of poverty, rather than unequal and
discriminatory economic and political structures. Tang concluded, “Southeast Asian
poverty can be metaphorically thought of as ‘collateral damage’ in the war against the
underclass.”13
Although Southeast Asian refugee resettlement is clearly implicated in important
historical narratives about poverty, dependence, and immigration in the twentieth century,
there has been virtually no work delineating what, exactly, policymakers at the federal,
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state, and local level meant by economic self-sufficiency, nor has there been an effort to
capture the concept’s historical contingency. Chapter One traced the thread of policy
which prioritized economic self-sufficiency prior to the resettlement of Cuban and
Southeast Asian refugees in the 1960s and 1970s when pre-existing ethnic communities
ensured that new refugees did not rely on the state for their support. Refugees who
contributed to the Cold War ideological battle against the USSR were “sold” to the
American public as productive and capable workers, and therefore, citizens. In this early
period, economic self-sufficiency was a cornerstone of refugee resettlement, but an
informal one, not mandated by any particular government policy or social service
program.
This chapter asks what policymakers meant by “economic self-sufficiency” in the
period following the 1980 Refugee Act, when it became the metric by which future
funding of social service providers would be determined by federal, state, and local
funding offices. More importantly, it asks what consequences the focus on selfsufficiency had for the lived experiences of refugees. This chapter centers the discourses
of poverty, dependence, welfare, and work which social services providers used to
manage their clients. In doing so it seeks to examine how these discursive structures
limited the range of policy possibility, and materially impacted the lives of the clients
served.
Trouble in Lowell
When the American Fund for Czechoslovakian Refugees resettled the first Hmong
refugee in Lowell, his caseworker placed him in housing, and gave him enough cash
support to survive until he visited the local welfare office to begin receiving his
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guaranteed benefits.14 He likely had a sponsor in the city who visited to explain the basics
of his new apartment, drove him to pick-up necessities such as food, and dropped him off
at the local welfare office. While the sponsor was supposed to remain involved in the
refugee’s life for a long period of adjustment, the sponsors of many of the new Lowell
arrivals were either non-existent, or only offered the bare minimum of assistance. As
David Specht of Lowell’s Christ Church United noted in 1981, “The majority of refugees
were brought into our community by a sponsoring agency that was, for the most part, illequipped to adequately resettle them.”15Although a small Vietnamese community already
lived in Lowell, when Hmong and Cambodian refugees began arriving in the city they
remained relatively isolated from both each other, and the larger Vietnamese community,
which was largely middle class. The International Institute of Lowell handled refugee
family re-unification applications, and provided basic case management services
including referrals, green card applications, and citizenship applications, but the city,
according to Jacqueline Fidler, “lacked a single public or private agency receiving
funding to provide direct services” to newly arrived refugees.16
Community leaders quickly expressed a range of concerns for refugees arriving in
the city. David Specht, of Lowell’s Christ Church United, wrote to Jacqueline Fidler
saying the result of inadequate post-resettlement services led to “an on-going pattern of
crisis situations…unmet needs in the area of medical attention, housing and food, fuel
14
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assistance and conflict resolution have presented themselves regularly.”17 Fidler herself
noted, “Refugee families in Lowell live in crowded one and two bedroom apartments that
are without heat or water in the winter, glass in the windows, or protection from
increasing rents.”18 Refugees themselves expressed particular concern over the bilingual
education of their children. At a meeting for parents of bilingual children an educator in
Lowell noted that refugees, “fear the children’s lack of English will discourage
them…they are anxious for the bilingual curriculum to begin.”19 The lack of ready social
services bred resentment both among refugees, who often expressed feelings of isolation
and being overwhelmed, and the receiving community as native residents of the city
raised concerns that refugees undercut wages and took jobs from local residents, used
more of the limited existing social services than they were entitled to, and, due to the
language barrier, caused problems for local businesses when they could not properly
count change, or explain what they were looking for.
Despite the broad range of unmet needs apparent to observers of the refugee
community, dependency emerged as the most serious threat to refugee success, with
employment serving as the linchpin around which the situation of refugees would
improve. Importantly, there is no indication that caseworkers ever asked the refugees they
served what they considered to be their greatest challenges. The most important
challenge for refugees and social service providers, at least in Jacqueline Fidler’s
estimation, was the fact that nearly half of the city’s refugees relied on welfare for
support. She noted, “If [newly arrived refugees] are not prepared for employment [they]
17
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will inevitably become public charges.” In early 1980, one hundred thirty refugees living
in Lowell relied on welfare. By early 1981 that number leapt to six hundred, an increase
of four hundred percent. City officials projected nearly one thousand more refugees in
1981 with eighty four percent destined to be reliant on welfare.20 Local city officials felt
that welfare dependence inevitably led to family breakdown, and initiated a cycle of
poverty that refugees would find it impossible to escape.
A local official in the Massachusetts Department of Social Services noted it
regularly saw “families…whose functioning is severely deteriorated,” and argued that
“lack of a regular and sufficient income is a major contributing factor to families in
trouble.”21 City officials and social service providers who identified welfare dependency
as the problem underlying all the challenges faced by refugees in Lowell identified
employment as the obvious solution. While the solution might have been obvious,
however, the means to achieving it remained obscure. Because, as Hai Ba Pho noted, the
new arrivals in Lowell “had little experience in the 9-5 industrial work pattern and no
English necessary for entering the workforce.”22
In August 1980 the Federal Register, the official journal of the federal
government highlighting rule changes and public notices, contained a small, concise
announcement that suggested a path forward for social service providers in Lowell: under
the provisions of the 1980 Refugee Act the Department of Health and Human Services
would be offering one year demonstration grants for mutual assistance associations to aid
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in the resettlement of refugees from Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos. The grant would
extend for one year, and would be worth up to fifty thousand dollars.23 Seeing the
advertisement Hai Ba Pho immediately seized on the opportunity to expand the IRF’s
services into Lowell. He noted, “We choose Lowell as the first, unique testing ground for
the expansion of our activities, namely direct services to the Indochinese refugee
population.”24 The Indochinese Refugee Foundation modeled its proposal after a similar
program that originated in Hartford. Only a year before, the Catholic Charities branch in
Hartford, Connecticut had put in a similar request for funding from the state. Catholic
Charities in Hartford had been established in June 1975 to resettle from refugees from
Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos in the greater Hartford area.
Within a year, nearly 1,000 had arrived in the US and been resettled by Catholic
Charities in Hartford, Connecticut. More importantly, voluntary agencies planned to
continue resettling refugees at a rate of fifty per month. Resettlement representatives of
Catholic Charities noted that ninety-five percent of the refugees resettled were unskilled
with no knowledge of English. As a result, ninety percent were entirely dependent on
welfare benefits. In their request for funding from the state of Connecticut Catholic
Charities noted their programming would emphasize job placement whenever possible.
After only a year the program had removed nearly seventy refugees, along with their
dependent families, from the welfare system. As Pho and Fidler crafted their proposal for
funding from FORR, they carefully followed the example set by Catholic Charities in
Hartford.25
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The IRF submitted its proposal to the FORR with three primary objectives
outlined: to provide work-related English language classes for refugees within ninety day
of arrival, to provide career counseling and secure job placement for at least thirty
refugees, and to remove that same number from welfare dependency.26 As a secondary
goal, the project proposal outlined plans to foster new leadership within refugee
communities, and, ideally, create the core of autonomous ethnic-based mutual assistance
associations. This goal was, of course, modeled after the experience of earlier refugees
that relied on pre-existing ethnic communities for support, such as Jewish and Czechs
refugees in earlier decades. Officials in the IRF hoped the Foundation would prove a
short-lived and transitional institution until an unnamed date in the future when refugees
themselves could look after new arrivals and ensure that welfare dependence did not
become a chronic and endemic problem.
Importantly, the proposal made notice, if only scant notice, of the expansive needs
of refugees in the community. Missing entirely were mentions of bilingual education,
inadequate medical care, substandard housing, and strained relations with native
residents. Only a month later Pho received a letter letting him know that the Foundation
had been approved for a grant for $47,592. The grant, for almost the entire amount
available for a single organization under the demonstration grant program, would
commence in October 1980 and expire in November 1981. After the grant’s expiration
the Foundation would not be eligible for further funding from FORR. Instead, the
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Foundation would have to rely on the state of Massachusetts to continue its
programming. 27
The Indochinese Self-Help Project
In October 1980, as the IRF settled into its role as a day-to-day service provider
for more than one thousand refugees, its officials focused the majority of their attention
on offering job placement services and English-language training for the job market.
First, the foundation conducted a careful assessment of Lowell’s labor market. Jacqueline
Fidler sent a form letter to dozens of local employers inquiring whether they had
unskilled or semi-skilled positions available for newly arrived refugees.28 She
commented that employers in the community seemed eager to employ refugees saying,
"Several employers began calling us interested in the prospects of employing refugees.”
As different employers responded, Fidler created a database of employers for counselors
to draw upon in their meetings with refugees. More importantly, the Foundation worked
to make the database easily accessible to any refugee that stopped into the Foundation’s
space. A weakness of the database, however, was that it was not made available in Khmer
(for Cambodians), Miao (for Hmong), or Lao. Fidler and IRF staff members believed an
accessible database would encourage refugees to seek employment opportunities on their
own initiative, and would discourage reliance on caseworkers and staff.
In addition to creating a network of support within Lowell the Foundation also
rolled out much awaited English as a Second Language courses. The IRF focused on
offering competency based, survival and pre-vocational ESL courses. Each level, survival
and pre-vocational, lasted eleven weeks. An ESL teacher for the program noted “The ESL
27
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here is the only competency based curriculum in the area. The emphasis of this ESL
program is on the English skills needed first to ‘survive’ and secondly to find
employment.”29 Competency based survival language classes emerged partly as a
response to the Vietnam-era refugee crises and the heightened need for new arrivals to
rapidly acquire language skills. The courses focused on “communicative” skills, rather
than instructing students in the intricacies of grammar. As ESL instructors Elsa Auerbach
and Denise Burgess noted, survival ESL aimed to give students “the practical abilities
that enable them to function in the new society.”30 The first portion of the classes, titled
Survival ESL, instructed English language learners how to handle the most basic
interactions they would encounter, including consumer skills such as providing personal
information, understanding money and credit, how to secure housing and medical care,
how to go shopping, pay taxes, obtain a driver’s license, and tell time.31
Once students completed Survival ESL they moved in to pre-vocational language
courses. According to Jacqueline Fidler pre-vocational courses aimed, "To provide
students with language and skills necessary for getting and keeping a job, an orientation
to the American job market, expectations about work in the US and the ability to deal
with the application and interview process without extensive assistance, and with work
related interpersonal interactions.”32 Importantly, the IRF decided not to offer prevocational courses to all its clients; only clients who wished and were deemed able to get,
keep, or advance in a job would be eligible for the pre-vocational courses. IRF
caseworkers did not delineate specific criteria used to determine who fit in this category.
29
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In this case, as in many others, power rested with the individual caseworker and his or her
perception of the refugee in front of them. According to Jacqueline Fidler, the majority of
refugees attended at least fifty percent of courses. She concluded, “Much of the
absenteeism was a result of the program's success in securing employment for
participants. As they acquired jobs, participants were no longer able to attend the classes,
held only during day-time hours."33 In what could be described as a catch-22, refugees
learned just enough English to get a job, but once in a job could no longer attend ESL
courses in the hope of advancing their careers.
Job placement and ESL for the labor market were conducted hand in hand by IRF
staff members. In order to prepare clients for job interviews, and more broadly for
“employment in American culture” IRF caseworkers held three-hour job clinics for
twenty refugees at a time. These clinics instructed refugees in how to search for a job,
how to write a resume, how to act during an interview, and how to discuss the basics of
wages and benefits. Caseworkers also matched clients with jobs and served as
interpreters during interviews.34 Further, after each interview the caseworker followed up
with prospective employers to inquire whether the refugee had given a successful
interview. Most importantly, the caseworker advised the potential employer that the IRF
would provide interpretive services for the employee for up to thirty days following a
new hire.35
In the space of only a year the assessment of the labor market had produced
tangible results in the form of refugee employment. By November over one hundred
refugees had participated in jobs interviews with another twenty-seven interviewed for
33
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skills training at employers such as Wang Labs. Of the one hundred job interviews, fortythree were successful, and of the twenty-seven skills training interviews, eight were
successful.36 An evaluation of the Self-Help Project defined its success primarily in terms
of its ability to reduce refugee dependency saying, “The consequent savings in welfare
payments and the new tax revenues generated through employment of refugees are
certainly important considerations in gauging the value of the [Self-Help] Project.”37
While the primary focus of the IRF remained on securing rapid employment and
reducing refugee dependence on welfare, it also devoted significant attention to broader
community relations. First, the foundation mobilized community resources. In particular
they drew on the International Institute of Lowell to provide interpreter services and
buildings on weekends for ethnic meetings. The IRF also drew on Church groups. St.
Patrick's Church members provided warm clothing and furniture. The Christ Church
United donated money and some its members volunteered as case-workers and sponsored
fund raising events.38 Perhaps more importantly, IRF officers felt a tremendous impulse
to “inform the public of the refugee situation in order to diminish some of the growing
tension and resulting hostility toward refugees.”39 In August 1981 Fidler noted, "We have
developed a working relationship with the area newspapers and radio stations in our
attempts to inform the general public” about the lives and experiences of refugees who
were resettled in Lowell.40 The officers felt that native residents of Lowell would
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welcome the refugees more generously if they understood the plight and trauma they
faced under communist regimes in Southeast Asia.41
Finally, the IRF concerned itself with fostering self-sustaining organizations
within refugee communities. Refugees themselves had insisted that assistance be offered
in developing their own organizations. Jacqueline Fidler explained, "Before the
Indochinese Self-Help Project, there was virtually no opportunity for the Indochinese
refugees of Lowell to meet with other. They remained in most instances, isolated,
frustrated, and overwhelmed by their new environment.”42 To build community among
Cambodians and Hmong in particular, the IRF organized a weekly film series throughout
the month of March. Each week the IRF screened three films, one on ESL skills, one on
Southeast Asia, and a final film for children. After the film screening refugees and
caseworkers, “Explored the concerns and needs of the refugee community.”43 The IRF
also assisted with forming ethnically-based organizations. By the end of the grant’s
demonstration period, the Laos Community of Lowell and the Cambodian Association of
Lowell had formed. The Cambodian Association in particular had “formalized its
membership” by charging two dollars a month to be placed into a special account that
members could draw on in case of emergencies. The organization had also elected its
President, Vice President, Secretary and Treasurer. "The Cambodian Association of
Lowell has formalized its membership and takes $2/month from families for
41
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emergencies. Between the Laos Community of Lowell and the Cambodian Association,
refugees independently conducted nine ethnic meetings, each with more than one
hundred people attending.44
In November 1981 the IRF reflected on the accomplishments of its first year as a
federally funded venture. Fidler noted that while the project had been intended to provide
intensive, direct services to thirty refugees, with auxiliary support for two hundred fifty
more, the project had far exceeded those figures by providing assistance to more than
eight hundred refugees total. More importantly, the Foundation had managed to combine
a primary focus on employment and ESL for the labor market with a recognition of the
much broader range of challenges facing their clients. The IRF had provided
interpretation and assistance in regard to housing, finances, medical care, welfare, mental
health, and education.
The IRF’s referral network ensured that “both the refugees and the services
agencies knew where to turn to advice, information, and assistance with their
problems.”45 It had also worked extensively with Southeast Asian youth, placing thirty
high school students in summer jobs. Foundation caseworkers expressed great pride that
they had fostered leadership within each ethnic group, and had worked cooperatively
with new leadership, existing organizations, and the broader community.46 Jacqueline
Fidler concluded, “Within a few short months, the Project became the focal point of
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services for refugees [and] was able to far exceed [its original] goals by taking a small
Self-Help Project and working it into a comprehensive Community Center.”47
Although the IRF made significant progress in stabilizing the situation of refugees
in Lowell, the Foundation noted several important shortcomings. According to Jacqueline
Fidler, the IRF found itself largely unable to service women with children. Fidler wrote,
“Many…remained isolated at home due to overwhelming cultural and language barriers
as well as a lack of day-care services.”48 IRF caseworkers instead focused their efforts on
finding employment and providing ESL for the labor market to male heads of household.
Lack of available daycare forced many women refugees to remain in the home. For the
large population of single women, this often translated into longer periods of welfare
dependence.
In the IRF’s analysis, a male head of household, employed full-time, would
reduce or eliminate the dependency of an entire family. This focus on the “family wage
system,” however, ignored several important realities about refugee families. First and
foremost, many families were headed by women. Under the Khmer Rouge, men were
disproportionately targeted and killed, leaving many families headed by women. The
IRF’s job placement and ESL for the labor market programs are microcosms reflecting
many of the weaknesses in the welfare state which was based on the family wage system,
or one with a male head of household and dependent wife and children. That model,
however, had largely fallen apart by the early 1980s in the face of structural changes to
the economy. By modeling its services on a family unit the IRF’s jobs placement and
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ESL for the labor market programs reproduced and reinforced existing social inequalities,
and failed to account for different family structures. .49
After a year of federal funding through the Department of Health and Human
Services as a demonstration project, the IRF was ineligible for further funding. Instead,
the organization had to turn to the Department of Social Services in the Commonwealth
of Massachusetts. In their request for funding the IRF asked for $143,000 and received
approval for a contract worth $83,000. Despite the rapidly increasing refugee population
in the Merrimack Valley, the IRF was still the only organization in the region granted
funding by the state of Massachusetts.50 Planning for the future, IRF caseworkers noted
their primary goals in the future would be, "To reduce welfare dependency, enhance
refugee self-sufficiency and adjustment, and address the refugee community's…cultural
concerns.” Fidler noted that, “In light of the declining public funding for social services
to all disadvantaged persons, including refugees from Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam,
efficient management of the domestic resettlement system is now more crucial than
ever.”51
Conclusion: Narrowing the Definition of Economic Self-Sufficiency
When federal funding for the Self-Help Project expired in December 1981 an
independent reviewer described the project as “the most fully developed Massachusetts
Mutual Aid Association.”52 Economic self-sufficiency had been structurally entrenched
in the primary operations of the IRF: job placement services and ESL for the labor
49
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market. Yet, IRF caseworkers had made an effort to address the much broader range of
refugee needs. Changes at the national level in 1982, however, compelled the project to
narrow its focus even further on rapid employment acquisition. The incoming Reagan
administration acted quickly to slash the refugee services budget, reducing it from $640
million to $581 million, for a total loss of $57 million.
The focus of programs narrowed further in 1982 with the passage of federal
amendments to the 1980 Refugee Act in the Refugee Assistance Amendments to the 1980
Refugee Act. A report by the General Accounting Office on the 1980 Refugee Act noted,
“Although the Refugee Act of 1980 emphasized the goal of self-sufficiency as quickly as
possible, only limited guidance on how soon self-sufficiency should begin to occur was
embodied in the Refugee Act.”53 The report noted that, going forward, states would be
required to disburse their refugee social service fund to services “most likely to result in
the earliest possible movement of refugees from cash assistance to economic selfsufficiency.”54 The amendments that followed the report required that, “All employable
refugees be placed in jobs as soon as possible after arriving in the United States,” and
reaffirmed that, “social service funds should be focused on employment-related
services.”55
Changing policy at the federal level strongly affected the experiences of refugees
in Lowell. As Senator Paul Tsongas (D-MA) noted, “These cuts are primarily in the cash
assistance and social services programs [for refugees].”56 At the Self-Help Project, Pho
and Fidler scrambled to secure state funding. After a highly competitive proposal stage,
53
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the Project received a contract with the state of Massachusetts for $83,000 (or $57,000
less than requested). The Project noted proudly that it was “the only agency awarded
funding in the Lowell area to service refugees.”57 Yet the Project also noted that the
budget shortfall would require it to cut “extraneous” services, in particular their contracts
with translators, and only retain ESL and job training programs. More importantly, the
IRF would have to scale back its already secondary efforts in community outreach
alongside efforts to assist refugees in securing housing and medical assistance. In early
1982 the IRF rolled out “Job for New Americans,” the subject of the next chapter, a
campaign intended to put the IRF’s programming in line with the increasingly narrow
definition of self-sufficiency mandated by the US Congress.
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CHAPTER 4
JOBS FOR NEW AMERICANS: THE CAMPAIGN TO HIRE THE
INDOCHINESE WORKER, 1983-1985
On June 11, 1982 the Indochinese Refugee Foundation (IRF) hosted a luncheon in
Lowell, Massachusetts to launch its new campaign, “Jobs for New Americans.” Only five
months earlier the state of Massachusetts had contracted with the Foundation to provide
ESL for the workplace and job placement to refugees from Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos
who were resettled in Lowell. IRF Founder Hai Ba Pho, himself a Vietnamese refugee,
along with successive program directors Jacqueline Fidler and Carol Keirstead, worked
tirelessly from the campaign’s inception to partner with regional businesses so their
refugee clients could secure employment rapidly, achieve economic self-sufficiency, and
get off of the welfare rolls. Representatives from more than twenty local businesses-including soon-to-be booming defense-funded high-technology firms such as Wang Labs,
Digital Equipment Corporation, and New England Instrument--attended the luncheon.
These high-tech firms often touted their companies as post-industrial workplaces, staffed
with high-skill, high-wage scientists and engineers. Whether it made it into company
brochures or not, however, the companies still required unskilled, low-wage workers to
staff their electronics assembly lines, to clean their buildings, or to operate their company
vehicles.
This chapter uses the IRF’s “Jobs” campaign to examine the relationship between
work, welfare dependency, and the efforts of resettlement social service providers to
transform refugees into productive American citizens through employment in the lowwage, unskilled segment of the labor market. Further, it traces how the narrow
interpretation of economic self-sufficiency, as the avoidance of welfare dependence,
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impacted the services offered to refugees in Lowell. Beginning in 1982, policymakers at
that national, state, and local level insisted that resettlement social services devote the
vast majority of their attention to preventing refugees from becoming a new welfare
dependent urban “underclass.”1 Welfare dependency has historically served to mark
individuals as socially unworthy and unfit for citizenship. Work, however, even lowwage, unskilled work, has been cast as a force that both reflected and constructed an
individual’s moral character and worthiness for citizenship. To place refugees in these
jobs, and reduce the burden of resettlement on the state, programs such as the IRF
inculcated refugees with what their corporate partners perceived to be the appropriate
attitudes for the American workplace: docility and high productivity despite low wage
rates. The chapter concludes by examining the sudden and unexpected dissolution of the
Indochinese Refugee Foundation in 1985, with the loss of funding from the Office of
Refugee Resettlement in Massachusetts. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, this
chapter asks at what long-term cost refugee resettlement programs reified wage labor.
At the IRF’s June 1982 luncheon, over the course of the afternoon Pho and Fidler
presented employers a slideshow communicating the characteristics Southeast Asian
refugees possessed that made them ideal employees for the most menial jobs in the

1

For an historical consideration of the term “underclass” see, Michael Katz, The Underclass Debate: Views
from History (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1993. For a discussion of Cambodian refugees as
an underclass see, Jacqueline Desbarats, “Cambodian and Laotian Refugees: An Underclass,” paper
presented at the annual meeting of the Population Association of America, San Francisco, April 4, 1986.
Their fears tapped into a historical aversion to potentially dependent immigrants. As early as 1882 U.S.
officials denied entry to immigrants if they were “likely to become a public charge.” Deirdre Moloney,
National Insecurities: Immigrants and U.S. Deportation Policy since 1882 (Chapel Hill, NC: University of
North Carolina Press, 2012), 177. On the history of welfare dependency and poverty in the U.S. see,
Michael Katz, The Price of Citizenship: Redefining the American Welfare State (New York: Metropolitan
Books, 2001), Jennifer Mttlestadt, From Welfare to Workfare: the Unintended Consequences of Liberal
Reform, 1945-1965 (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 2005),

56

postindustrial workplace.2 With pictures of refugees driving company vehicles and
manning assembly lines in the background, Pho and Fidler told potential employers that
Southeast Asians had an impeccable work ethic, and strove to exceed production goals
without complaint. Relying on racial stereotypes of Asian immigrants as hardworking,
they also emphasized that Southeast Asians were “born and bred to self-sufficiency [and]
accustomed to hard work from early youth.”3 A pamphlet advertising the campaign
proclaimed that refugees understood that individuals such as themselves “with limited
skills and education must begin at the bottom and work their way up. Just as other
immigrant groups have done before them.”4 In their campaign material, the IRF carefully
communicated to potential employees that refugees were only welfare dependents as a
result of extreme, and extenuating, circumstances. As a key component of the “Jobs”
campaign, it was designed to appeal to the perceived progressive and liberal values of
local business owners. In short, the campaign promised local business owners a cheap
and steady supply of labor on the one hand, and a public relations opportunity to paint
their businesses as doing a service to the broader community by assisting refugees on the
other.
An ESL teacher who worked with IRF clients echoed Pho and Fidler’s
characterizations in an interview for the Lowell Sun covering the campaign launch, noting
“We have some very well-educated people. One gentleman was a teacher in Cambodia
who is now working as an assembler at Wang. He’s so thrilled to have a job…He’s not
insulted by the work.”5 Michael Jaw, who employed refugees as electronics assemblers at
2
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his distribution company, concluded, “Indochinese refugees are a continuing asset to my
company, and I must say I find personal satisfaction in helping these people become
productive Americans.”6 Throughout the entire “Jobs” campaign, and indeed from the
inception of the IRF in 1976 to its dissolution in 1985, work--both the desire and the
ability--were the key metrics against which social service providers and local citizens
measured the worthiness of refugees for inclusion both in broader American society, and
in the local community. However, following the 1982 amendments to the 1980 Refugee
Act, the focus on economic self-sufficiency increasingly became defined as avoidance of
welfare through low-wage work. Although social service providers in Lowell still
recognized the broad range of challenges facing refugees, they no longer had the time or
resources to make these needs even secondary priorities.
Work and Southeast Asian Refugee Resettlement
Examining the jobs for which refugees were imagined to be suited, and were
funneled into by programs such as the IRF, opens a window into several key aspects of
work in the post-World War II period. First, it brings to light the centrality of military
spending to regional economies. Lowell’s IRF formed long-term partnerships with
defense-funded firms to employee refugees as electronics assemblers, janitors, and
drivers. Indeed, Cambodian refugees came to Lowell by the thousands when Wang Labs
secured a 485 million dollar contract with the U.S. Air Force in 1986.7 Second, the focus
on low-wage, low-skill workers in industries touted as “post-industrial” challenges the
dominant image of high-technology workers as well-paid scientists and engineers. As
journalist Andrew Kopkind wrote in The Nation, “The Cambodians were low-tech
6
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workers in high-tech industries…poorly paid, denied benefits, kept in poor conditionsand laid off [first] when the companies began downsizing.”8 Thus, an examination of
refugees as workers in the electronics industry offers a compelling case study in Cold
War labor history which cannot be separated from the U.S.’s role on the world stage.
Third, examining the public-private employment partnerships formed by the IRF
with defense contractors brings to light the role the Foundation, as an agent of the state,
played in racializing Southeast Asian refugees.9 It is no coincidence that debates about
refugee welfare dependency haunt Cambodians and Hmong refugees, who, like African
Americans and Latinos, tended to find work in insecure, low-wage, and low-skill
industries, such as electronics assembly, which often necessitated periodic stints on
welfare. As scholar Lisa Lowe has demonstrated, work cannot be disentangled from the
“racialized bodies” performing it.10 Finally, a careful reading of the IRF’s employment
programming in the years prior to the “Jobs” campaign reveals the “everyday forms of
resistance,” particularly evasiveness, tardiness, and refusal to accept offered employment,
engaged in by refugees. These brief glimpses of resistance suggest resettlement was not
just a hegemonic project imposed on refugees, but rather a conflicted process in which
refugees tried to exert their own agency.11 In the absence of refugee voices in caseworker
files, these moments of resistance offer a fleeting glimpse into the mindset and lived
experiences of the refugees the IRF served.
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Jobs for New Americans
The narrowing definition of economic self-sufficiency came into focus for IRF
caseworkers during a two-part training session, held in Washington DC, sponsored by the
Federal Office of Refugee Resettlement (FORR) and attended by program director
Jacqueline Fidler. FORR intended the training conference to assist social service
providers in ensuring that their programs adopted methodologies that encouraged
refugees to rapidly achieve economic self-sufficiency. In a report out to her IRF
colleagues, Fidler noted that one portion of the training instructed caseworkers to warn
refugees about “the dangers of becoming hooked on welfare, and the unrealistic view
many of the refugees have of the ‘unlimited opportunities in the U.S.”12 The other portion
of the training, according to Fidler, “stressed the need for orientation for refugees
regarding good work habits.” In particular, FORR officials stressed to caseworkers that
refugees should be instructed in the importance of high productivity, compliance, and
acceptance of low-wages in the work place.
The IRF proved successful in its bid to bring the conference’s mandates/lessons to
their own social service provisions. For instance, during job placement sessions, IRF
caseworkers? Regularly coached refugees in the appropriate attitude and work ethic for
their new jobs. More importantly, they were continually encouraged to feel a sense of
gratitude to the employers going out on a limb to offer them jobs. In a letter to the human
resources department at Wang Labs, Carol Keirstead wrote, "We [the IRF] are
continuously grateful to Wang for their efforts in meeting the employment needs of the
refugees living in Lowell…The Indochinese refugees, the Cambodian, Laotian and
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Vietnamese communities of Lowell, are grateful and feel fortunate to be living here in
Lowell” where they can find employment at Wang.13 The job training offered by IRF
caseworkers produced tangible results for Lowell businesses. One Lowell employer
noted, “The productivity of the Indochinese worker here is 20% higher than the overall
factory average; and they don’t need to be pushed by their foreman.”14 Another said,
“Refugees are diligent. Really diligent. They use their heads and are very good with their
hands.”15
Fidler also made it clear to her clients that continued dependency on welfare
would have dire consequences that could potentially impact the lives of family members
of refugees still in Thailand awaiting resettlement. In a mass mailing, the Project wrote to
refugees in Lowell, “If there are too many refugees receiving welfare, the state may not
allow more refugees to settle here.”16 Refugees soon found this message served as no idle
warning when their family reunification applications became dependent upon their
progress toward self-sufficiency. Applicants who owned a car, held down steady jobs, or
“seemed responsible” were approved. Applicants who, on the other hand, did not own
cars, lacked jobs, or seemed “irresponsible and overwhelmed” were denied the right to be
reunited with their mothers, brothers, and extended family.17 One rejected application
noted that “[applicant] is a young woman with little resources and virtually no English.”18
Perhaps no other aspect of the IRF’s interactions with refugees highlights the significance
13
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of these “street level bureaucrats” than their power to grant or deny refugees the right to
their family members.19
After 1982, the IRF’s Self-Help Project proposed to provide low-cost job
placement and vocational English to “assist the increasing number of refugees in their
journey toward self-sufficiency in the U.S.”20 Yet the broader range of challenges
refugees faced in Lowell, particularly regarding housing, transportation, and adequate bilingual education programs, were now only tangentially mentioned, if at all. The IRF, to
put it bluntly, proposed employment as the panacea for all the ills plaguing Lowell’s
newest residents. The new federal mandates made the business community the most
reasonable focus for the IRF. As a result, its officers devoted the majority of their
attention to fostering its contacts within in the business community. In particular,
caseworkers contacted Arthur Kelts, the human resources director of The National
Alliance of Business, which had recently formed a local office in the Merrimack Valley.
IRF Project Director Carol Keirstead contacted Kelts for assistance in locating
employment for refugees during the earliest outreach for the Self-Help Project. Kelts
recognized the increasing importance of refugees in low-wage entry level positions
saying, “The Indochinese who have moved into the Lowell area have become a vital part
of our new work force.” As a result, he agreed to enter into an alliance with the IRF to
“provide direct job development and marketing to area employers to help find suitable
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employment for the people you are assisting.”21 With the support of diverse members of
the business community the IRF launched its jobs campaign in 1983.
During the “Jobs” campaign, IRF caseworkers focused primarily on reaching out
to local businesses. After a year of campaigning, caseworkers noted that they had placed
nearly one hundred refugees in unsubsidized employment with over forty companies.22
Although IRF caseworkers spent countless hours canvassing Lowell and the surrounding
cities for available jobs, they restricted their search to only those in the lowest wage and
least skilled segments of the labor market. In 1982, for example, the Electro-Optics
Division of Honeywell sent the Foundation a list of skilled and technical positions. Carol
Keirstead responded, “As you may know, most of the refugees in our program are
unskilled…and are best suited for entry level positions. I would appreciate hearing from
you should you have any openings in manufacturing, electronics assembly, maintenance,
or other entry level positions.”23
In much the same way that caseworkers held immense power over their refugee
clients in terms of family reunification, Keirstead’s letter to Honeywell indicates they
exercised similar power over the job opportunities refugees were ever presented with. A
careful reading of the resumes submitted to IRF caseworkers reveals a broad range of
career and educational backgrounds. Although it is certainly possible there were no
refugees suited for a position within the optics division of Honeywell, a cursory survey of
the archives reveals that many refugees were, in fact, suited for positions well above the
entry-level. However, two deeply-held beliefs among IRF caseworks obscured this fact.
21
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First, IRF caseworkers viewed refugees, particularly from Cambodia and Laos, as premodern, agricultural peoples. In this view, refugees needed to be trained in the habits and
mentality of modern industrial workers. Second, caseworkers viewed refugees as new
immigrants who ought to be grateful for the opportunities presented. As described earlier,
one refugee, a university professor in Cambodia, had found employment as an electronics
assembler. Caseworkers exalted the individual’s work ethic, without pausing first to
consider that these refugees were not immigrants, even if they have been conflated as
such for decades. The needs of refugees in Lowell were imagined to be nearly identical to
the needs of immigrants: jobs and language skills. Refugees from Cambodia, Vietnam,
and Laos, however, had much wider needs. Surviving genocide, the trauma of flight, loss
of family members, and exile from home scarred individuals in ways that perhaps could
not be ameliorated at all, but certainly least of all by job skills. More importantly,
imagining the needs of refugees to be identical to those of immigrants further obscured
the complicity of the US in creating the humanitarian crisis. Finally, by casting the
refugee story in the progressive terms often used to describe the rise of immigrants into
the middle-class, IRF officers elided the economic realities their refugee clients faced.
The electronics assembly jobs, janitorial work, and stitching jobs were not pathways to
upward economic mobility. In most cases the jobs were pathways into the struggle of the
working-poor, as they have often been throughout history.
While the project increasingly focused its attention on employment, it also
retained its focus on ESL for the job market. Students who completed both survival and
pre-vocational ESL were then moved into the project’s job skills programming. As the
previous chapter outlined, these courses emphasized “survival” skills and the most basic
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interactions, both in the wider world and in the workplace. Yet as ESL instructor Elsa
Auerbach has noted, “what is excluded…is as important…as what is included.”24
Students received no instruction on how to communicate about inadequate services or
discriminatory treatment. The curriculum implied such instances were outside the norm,
and thus led students to believe the unjust treatment was “the result of the students’ own
inadequacies.”25 After students completed survival ESL, they moved into pre-vocational
ESL programs. Similarly, these courses stressed basic job communication skills, and did
not prepare students to negotiate wages, benefits, and hours. Further, the curriculum
remained silent on workers’ rights. The cumulative, and unintended, effect of the ESL
programming offered by the Self-Help Project limited the ability of refugees to
communicate the full range of their experiences. Indeed, none of the English language
training touched upon language as something refugees might use to communicate
distress, or share the trauma they experienced before arriving in the U.S. When one major
employer noted his refugee employees “gave management no problems,”26 this docility
likely stemmed not from innate character traits that made Southeast Asians ideal workers,
but from an inability or unwillingness to do otherwise, as instilled and reinforced by
encounters with service providers from refugee camps in Thailand, to processing centers
in the Philippines, and now with domestic resettlement programs.
One of the most vaunted achievements of the Self-Help Project which the IRF
planned to expand into the Jobs for New Americans Campaign was its eight-week
electronics assembly training program, led by a foremen from Wang Labs. Over the
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course of the program students learned the techniques and skills necessary to solder on an
electronics assembly line at firms located on the high-technology belt which emerged in
the region north of Boston. During the course, refugees took a series of progress
assessments, which required they write their name, the town they lived in, the nation of
their birth, and their prior work experience. At the end refugees were required to answer
the question “Why would you like to work as an electronics assembler?” Those who
responded “Because I enjoy the work,” or “Because I am looking for a good job,”
received full credit. Those who responded, “Because it is easy,” “Because I need
experience to get a better job,” or “Because I want a good recommendation for future
employment,” were docked up to ten points.27 The rest of the training instructed refugees
“in the habits and…expectations” of their future employers.28 The electronics training
course, like the ESL curriculum, instilled in the refugee-trainees an unwillingness and
inability to complain or question their employers.
Although the Project proved to be a steady labor source for refugees in the Lowell
area, it was the Self-Help Project that regularly expressed gratitude to the employers with
whom they partnered. In a letter to Grace Shoes, which employed refugees as stitchers,
Fidler wrote, “By employing refuges in your manufacturing company, you have given
them the opportunity to fulfill their heritage of pride and dignity.”29 Wang labs, which
employed hundreds of refugees as electronics assemblers by 1985, received frequent
thanks and praise from IRS caseworkers. Carol Keirstead wrote the Wang Lab human
27
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resources, “We are very grateful for Wang’s contribution in assisting refugees in
becoming self-sufficient.”30 At a luncheon held exclusively for employers who had
offered jobs to refugees, the Foundation awarded Wang Labs a special title, “Friends of
the Foundation.”31
Yet the effusive praise ignored one of the chief reasons high-tech firms had
arrived in Massachusetts, and why they were interested in Southeast Asian refugees
specifically: cheap labor. Wages for industrial workers in Detroit and Pittsburgh, which
had higher unionization rates, were 40% and 25% higher respectively than for workers in
Massachusetts, respectively, for the same job in electronics assembly. In terms of wages,
a high-tech assembler in Detroit earned an average salary of $17,145 a year, compared to
$14,090 in Pittsburgh, and a bargain basement rate of $10,576 in Massachusetts. In
addition, workers outside of Massachusetts unionized at much higher rates.32 Southeast
Asian refugees in Lowell represented an untapped labor market that could be employed
for even less than the already low rate in Lowell. On average, Southeast Asian refugees
were employed as electronics assemblers for $4.50 an hour. This translated to a yearly
salary of $9,360, or more than $1,000 less than even the prevailing wage in
Massachusetts, which sat at $10,576.33
Although refugees had limited power with which to challenge the social service
providers and employers they encountered, it does not mean the Project was entirely
successful in inculcating the refugees with the desired traits of low-wage, unskilled,
docile workers. Grace Shoes expressed overall satisfaction with their refugee employees,
30

Paul Guzzi to Carol Keirstead, March 17, 1983, Folder 12, Box 2, IRF Papers.
Paul Guzzi to Carol Keirstead, March 17, 1983, Folder 12, Box 2, IRF Papers.
32
Patricia Flynn, "Lowell: A High Technology Success Story,” New England Economic Review Sept/Oct.
(1984): 39-47.
33
Indochinese Refugee Foundation, Wages by Company and Shift Chart, Folder 45, Box 2, IRF Papers.
31

67

but one report from the corporation requested the Project only send potential employees
who “would be content to work hard” after a large number of refugees quit.34 Another
report noted that a refugee hired at Wang had refused to start because he did not like the
hours offered.35 In another case, the state of Massachusetts sanctioned a welfare recipient
for failure to cooperate with the work requirement. According to the case report, the
individual’s benefits were terminated after the refugee quit his job. In an interview the
refugee stated he wanted to learn more jobs skills, that he could not understand his
supervisor, and that the work aggravated an injury he received fleeing Cambodia.36 In
these brief moments of resistance to the authority of social service providers and
employers, refugees expressed discontent with the services provided and jobs offered.
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Table 1 Sample of Refugee Job Placements October 1980-August 198437
Company Name
Wang Labs
New England Instrument
Grace Shoes
Portex
Digital Equipment
BASF
Jamper
Prince Packaging
St. John's Hospital
Microwave
Power Cube
Controlonics
Lowell Public Schools
Prince Grotto
Container Services
Alden and Rolder
Sundown Quilt

Average Starting
Wage

Job Title
Electronics Assembly
Electronics Assembly
Stitcher
N/A
Electronics Assembly
Chemical Mixer
Stitcher
Packer
Laundry Assistant
Electronics Assembly

$4.05

$6.14
$4.60

Electronics Assembly
Bi-lingual Teacher's Aide
Dishwasher
Truck Loader

Average Starting Wage

$4.22
$5.40

$4.00
$3.50
4.56

The Dissolution of the IRF
By September 1984 the future of the IRF in Lowell seemed secure. The
Foundation had formed in Boston in 1976 to serve Vietnamese refugees rapidly being
resettled in the city. Only a few years later, in 1979, co-founder Hai Ba Pho had
redirected the energy of the Foundation toward the Merrimack Valley Area as refugee
resettlement rapidly increased. Following the passage of the 1980 Refugee Act, the IRF
had secured both competitive federal and state funding for nearly five years. Indeed, by
September 1984 the foundation would have received over a half a million dollars in state
support. In Lowell, the Foundation had placed over four hundred refugees into full-time
37
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jobs, often removing both the employed individual and his or her entirely family from
welfare dependence. Further, the Foundation had provided over three hundred refugees
with comprehensive survival ESL.
Keirstead described the Foundation’s accomplishments saying, “To the local
community, we have provided the necessary link between themselves and the refugee
communities. Locally our work has been support, recognized and appreciated.”38 As a
result of the 1980 Refugee Act’s mandates the IRF’s programming centered economic
self-sufficiency to the detriment of the broader range of its client’s needs. This was,
however, an inevitable weakness, which is apparent in a range of other locales where
voluntary agencies resettled refugees in large numbers. Indeed, despite this weakness the
IRF did, at the end of the day, provide unparalleled and desperately needed support to a
refugee community that otherwise would have been left entirely to its own devices.
When the IRF attempted to renew its contract with the Massachusetts Office of
Refugee Resettlement (MORR) in 1984, however, IRF Project Director Carol Keirstead
was met with a cold reception. MORR officials informed Keirstead that the IRF would
not have its contract renewed, and all its activities would have to be phased down for
final cancelation in January 1985. Although IRF caseworkers and officers were caught
off guard by the sudden loss of funding, they were, in fact, simply caught in the crossfire
of a much broader shift in refugee resettlement policy occurring in the state of
Massachusetts. MORR increasingly looked to ethnically-based mutual assistance
organizations, rather than broad based organizations like the IRF, to provide basic case
management and social services to refugee communities. In Lowell, the Cambodian
Mutual Assistance Association took over both Employment Services and ESL for the job
38
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market.39 Similar organizations in the Laotian and Vietnamese communities proposed to
take over job services and to jointly run ESL classes. In the analysis of MORR,
organizations run by community members would be more likely to successfully
encourage economic self-sufficiency. Yet, IRF caseworkers criticized this viewpoint for
two reasons. First, the IRF was run as a pan-ethnic organization with deep ties to the
business community, and emerging ties with different groups of native residents. IRF
officers argued that fragmenting social services by ethnicity served to dilute the little
power that sheer numbers conferred on refugees in the competition for scarce resources
in the city. Further, they contended that fragmentation would only serve to re-isolate
refugees within insular communities.
The IRF planned to immediately cease public relations and public
communication. Keirstead described the contract negotiations saying, “Based on our
success…it is more than incongruous that our program be treated as it was during the
recent 'contract negotiations.' (And I used the word negotiation very loosely).”40 As a
result, the Program Director would immediately drop to half time, and the bilingual staff
would have halved. Although, as Keirstead pointed out, the Massachusetts Office of
Refugee Resettlement, which declined to renew the IRF’s contract, exerted no influence
over the ever increasing number of refugees being resettled in Lowell. She concluded,
“Out of our negotiations came not only a loss of services but a loss of faith.”41 After
nearly five years in the community, and a highly successful jobs placement campaign, the
IRF had officially dissolved. Its operations transferred to ethnically based organizations,
and its contributions to refugee resettlement were largely forgotten.
39
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Conclusion
Yet, the legacy of the IRF far outlasted its own lifetime. The ethnically-based
organizations seeded by the Foundation have lasted into the present day. Yet, the cost of
the Foundation’s main programming goal, prioritizing employment, proved high.
Despite their best intentions it led the IRF and other similar organizations across the
United States, to neglect the complex needs of the people they served. Institutionalized
neglect pushed refugees into the lowest paying, least secure, and least skilled sections of
the labor market while largely ignoring the persistent need for adequate medical care,
food, fuel, and housing, and bi-lingual education programs. In Lowell, these problems
were exacerbated by thousands of refugees flooding into the city in 1986 after Wang
Labs secured a half a billion dollar contract with the Navy.42 Wang Labs drew on the
network of community connections fostered by the IRF to recruit refugees to work
through the mutual assistance associations, as well as through radio spots. By using these
networks Wang attracted Cambodian refugees from across the United States, and as far
afield as the Thai refugee camps.43 As a result of the rapid influx of new refugees, and
the lack of infrastructure resulting from early resettlements prioritization of employment,
conflict erupted in the city. The epilogue takes up one of those conflicts: resistance and
resentment among refugees reaching a boiling point in the battle over Lowell’s
segregated public schools in the mid-1980s.
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EPILOGUE
THE CONFLICTED AND FORGOTTEN LEGACY OF THE INDOCHINESE
REFUGEE FOUNDATION
On May 6, 1987, over one hundred Latino, Lao, and Cambodian parents attended
a meeting of the Lowell School Committee to express their concerns over the education
of their children. The parents requested that their interpreters be allowed to translate the
meeting so as to ensure their full participation. One of the school committee members,
George Kouloheras, a third-generation Greek immigrant, objected to the presence of
translators, and insisted School Committee meetings had been, and should continue to be,
conducted in English-only. As University of Massachusetts Boston Professor Peter Kiang
has pointed out, the English-only incident was only one of many “anti-minority and antiimmigrant incidents including racial harassment, tire slashings, broken windows, [and
instances of] job and housing discrimination” that refugees had faced as their population
in Lowell rapidly grew.1 Importantly, the parents did not limit their expressions of
discontent solely to the trouble in the school system, but brought to light the larger issues
of racism and discrimination that Southeast Asian refugees faced in the city. Sommanee
Bounphasaysonh, of the Lao Association of Greater Lowell noted, “When they [the
School Committee, city officials, etc.] say Americans, they don’t mean us-look at our
eyes and our skin. We are minorities, but we have rights too.”2 By 1987 racial tensions in
the community had reached unprecedented heights.
According to parents, the public school system had segregated nearly two hundred
students from grades one through six in inadequate facilities which lacked appropriate
1
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faculty, staff, and accommodations. Classes for bi-lingual students were being held in
hallways, in boiler rooms, basements, and even in a half converted bathroom. Parents
involved in the protest took particular aim at white native residents of the city, such as
Kouloheras claiming, “They don’t want our minority children mixing with their white
children-they are not thinking of the education of all kids, only of their kids.”3 Similar
segregation at the high school level had led to a precipitous decline, over fifty percent, in
the number of Lao students graduating in 1986. As Kiang noted, “For the Southeast
Asian parents who had sacrificed and endured unspeakable hardships in order to provide
their children with a chance for education…the conditions….had become intolerable.”4
In a bid to force the school system to change, the parents formed a pan-ethnic
coalition called the Minority Association for Mutual Assistance. Assisted by the
Multicultural Education Training & Advocacy, an NGO based out of Boston, the parents
filed a lawsuit against the Lowell School Committee and the City of Lowell. The
complaint demanded restitution for the damage already done to students forced into
inadequate facilities, but also included a 33-point program to reform the educational
system. Parents demanded greater diversity in hiring practices, comprehensive
curriculum reform, special education development, and more consistent parent
involvement. In November 1988, facing a lawsuit from the state of Massachusetts, the
School Committee voted 6-1 in favor of the settlement. The desegregation plan put an
end to neighborhood based schooling, and required the immediate busing of 700 students
to schools outside their neighborhoods. The victory proved an unprecedented one for bilingual families, but seemed bittersweet. Only a month prior to the School Committee’s
3
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capitulation a thirteen year old Cambodian boy, named Vandy Phomy, had been killed by
an eleven year old white classmate. Phomy’s and his younger brother had been on their
way fishing when they were stopped and assaulted by Phomy’s classmate. After shouting
racial epithets at Phomy, his classmate pushed him in the Merrimack River where he
tragically drowned.5
Phomy’s death, rather than the alliance of Southeast Asian and Hispanic parents,
proved far more indicative of the conflict to come in the city. During the conflict, House
Representative for Lowell Chester Atkins had noted that the boom in high-technology,
which brought so many to the city, “always had two sides- a glittering side and a dark
side.”6 In 1988 Wang Labs, one of the major employers of refugees, and Lowell
residents more broadly, entered what would become a sustained decline. As
unemployment rose, so too did racial tensions in the city. In 1991, residents of the city
formally adopted English as the official, and only language, of Lowell. Only a short time
later John Silber, in his campaign for governor, asked “Why should Lowell be the
Cambodian capital of America,” and answered that refugees were drawn to the city to
take advantage of the state’s welfare benefits, rather than work in its most menial jobs.
Only one year later Wang Labs declared bankruptcy as it lost its defense department
funding, and found itself outmaneuvered in the market by IBM.
This thesis used the Indochinese Refugee Foundation of Lowell, Massachusetts as
a case-study in the local politics of refugee resettlement to conclude that the conflicts
erupting in Lowell during the mid-1980s and the early 1990s cannot be understood
5
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without first examining how and why refugees ever came to be resettled in Lowell in the
first place. Refugees from Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos did not arrive in the city at
random. Instead, the American Fund for Czechoslovakian Refugees (AFCR) and the
American Council for Nationalities Services (ANCS), contracted and in partnership with
the federal government, deliberately selected Lowell as a resettlement site. Yet, the
violence and conflict in Lowell suggest that something went seriously awry in the
resettlement process. Importantly, the conflicts that erupted in the city did not emerge
simply as a result of local circumstances. Instead, they can be traced to the philosophy of
resettlement codified in the 1980 Refugee Act, which mandated that social service
providers prioritize economic self-sufficiency.
In concrete policy terms, economic self-sufficiency proved vulnerable to changing
political winds, and came to mean rapid labor market participation and, most importantly,
avoiding welfare dependence. In its first two years the IRF prioritized rapid job
placement and welfare avoidance, but also dedicated a small portion of its time and
budget to community relations, medical care, education, housing, and translation
services. The budget cuts to social services that followed the election of Ronald Reagan
to the presidency, however, forced the IRF to cut even the small portion of its budget
focused on those broader needs. As a result refugees became increasingly isolated, and
community relations rapidly deteriorated leading to the conflicts described above.
Yet, as a case study it suggests, this is merely the tip of the iceberg in a much
bigger history, both within the city of Lowell, and in the study of refugee resettlement
more broadly. As for the former, the exact relationship between Wang Labs and the
ethnically based mutual aid associations after the IRF dissolved in 1985 remains unclear.
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Only work with the archives of the Cambodian Mutual Assistance Association, which
still operates in Lowell and stores its unprocessed archives in a closet, could shed light on
that relationship. Further, there has been no research connecting the events in Lowell to
other locales in Massachusetts. Anecdotal evidence suggests that very similar conflicts
with Cambodian refugees over segregated public schools erupted in Holyoke during the
same time period.
In thinking of future examinations of refugee resettlement, two things ought to be
prioritized. First, oral history should be a key methodological component. One of the key
challenges to this study, the lack of refugee voices, could be remedied by comprehensive
oral histories. Second, a comparative approach should be taken. Evidence suggests that
refugee resettlement agencies in other locales as diverse as Illinois, California, and
Washington state all prioritized employment and placed their refugees in defense funded
electronics assembly. Perhaps most importantly, future studies of the resettlement of
refugees from Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos face the obligation, and the challenge, of
critically assessing a program so often trotted out as a means of soothing the traumatic
memory of a difficult war.
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